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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Sears Roebuck was sued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission for discriminating against women by denying
them positions in departments that paid commissions.1 Nearly thirty years
* Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Law and Society
Conference held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and I am grateful for the comments I received at that time,
as well as for the excellent research assistance of Stacy Garrick, Terra Nevitt and Emily Bradford. I
also received generous and helpful comments from Naomi Cahn, Marion Crain, Anne-Marie Harris,
Christine Jolls, Gillian Lester, Wendy Parker and Joan Williams, and two anonymous referees.
1. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988). Although the case was decided in the 1980s, it was originally filed in 1973. See EEOC
v. Sears, 839 F.2d at 307. A substantial critical literature has developed around the Sears case, much of
which focused on the court’s conclusion that women had “chosen” the non-commission paying jobs.
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women in Title VII Cases: Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1799-1839 (1990); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
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later, Wal-Mart, which for many Americans had replaced Sears as their
shopping destination of choice, was sued for assigning women to limited
dead-end jobs that did not offer promotional possibilities.2 In both cases,
the companies defended the make-up of their workforce by claiming that
their workplace assignments were based on women’s own preferences and
that many women who worked for the companies lacked interest in
management positions.3 In the last decade, lawsuits nearly identical to
those filed against Wal-Mart and Sears have been initiated against Home
Depot and most of the major grocery chains around the country.4
In 1974, the brokerage firm Merrill Lynch was sued for sex
discrimination for refusing to hire women as brokers.5 The case settled
shortly thereafter with a pledge by the firm to hire more women for its
broker positions.6 A quarter of a century later, Merrill Lynch was again
sued for failing to hire women as brokers, and consigning the women it did
hire to positions as sales associates, positions that typically did not lead to
management level jobs.7 As discussed in more detail below, during the last
decade similar lawsuits have been filed against most of the major brokerage
firms in the country.8
These cases, and many others like them, offer an important challenge
to the reigning view regarding the persistence of sex discrimination in the
workplace. Currently there is a widespread consensus, both in and outside
of academia, that workplace discrimination against women has both
MICH. L. REV. 797, 813-45 (1989).
2. See Reed Abelson, 6 Women Sue Wal-Mart, Charging Job and Promotion Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2001, at C1.
3. Compare EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1305 (“Sears has proven, with many forms of
evidence, that men and women tend to have different interests and aspirations regarding work, and that
these differences explain in large part the lower percentage of women in commission sales jobs in
general at Sears, especially in the particular divisions with the lowest proportion of women selling on
commission.”) with Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Faces Lawsuit Over Sex Discrimination,
N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at A22 (noting that a Wal-Mart official “said women’s lack of interest in
managerial jobs helped explain the lower percentage of women managers”).
4. These cases are discussed in section II. I have previously written about the Home Depot case.
See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1249, 1281-89 (2003).
5. See Noelle Knox, Wall Street Battles Sexual Bias Even as Brokerage Industry Fights
Discrimination, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2000, at 1B (discussing 1974 lawsuit).
6. Id.
7. See Stanley Ziemba, Merrill Lynch Hit With Bias Suit, CHI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 14, 1997, at B1.
The Merrill Lynch case is discussed further in section II, infra. One thing that has changed is some of
the methods of discrimination. In 1974, prospective stockbrokers were asked, “Which quality in a
woman do you consider most important?” The choices were beauty, intelligence, dependence,
independence and affectionateness. Applicants were given two points for answering dependency or
affectionateness, one point for beauty, and no points for intelligence or independence. See Knox, supra
note 5, at 1B.
8. The cases filed against stock brokerage firms are discussed in section II infra.
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receded and changed substantially over the last three decades.9 The
workplace barriers women now face are more commonly attributed to their
family commitments, rather than to employer or even societal
Recent popular accounts sound a similar theme,
discrimination.10
emphasizing how observed labor market disparities are the product of
choices women make between their work and family obligations.11 To the
extent that discrimination is still seen as problematic, such discrimination is
generally identified as subtle, often unconscious in nature, and relatively
free of what is often described as an intent to discriminate. 12
Yet, the class action employment discrimination cases that have arisen
over the last decade cast doubt on this portrait of the workplace, and
collectively suggest that discrimination remains a more powerful force in
the labor market than is typically acknowledged. These lawsuits have
targeted particular, and often entire, industries, including securities, retail,
restaurants and automobile manufacturing. Contrary to the contemporary
emphasis on subtle discrimination, there is rarely anything subtle about the
conduct at issue in these cases; rather, all of the cases involve overt sex
discrimination, and, at least within these industries, provide substantial
insight into the persistence of sex segregation and workplace inequality for
women.
By highlighting how these cases are inconsistent with the emphasis on
subtle discrimination, I do not mean to suggest that the subtle
discrimination hypothesis is wrong or even inaccurate. Indeed, I have
previously written about the importance and effect of subtle discrimination

9. This issue is discussed in more detail in section III.A. See also sources cited infra, notes 10,
12. Barbara Reskin, one of the country’s leading sociologists studying workplace discrimination, has
recently moved away from emphasizing intentional discrimination towards emphasizing the way in
which subtle often unconscious factors perpetuate inequality. See Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate
Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 326 (2000) (noting that “I and others
suspect that most employment discrimination originates in the cognitive processes . . . .” ).
10. For a sampling of the extensive literature see ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS
OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (2004); ANITA ILTA GARVEY, WEAVING
WORK AND MOTHERHOOD (1999); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000).
11. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, Magazine, at 42
(profiling women who have left prestigious jobs to stay home with their children).
12. For discussions of the changing nature of sex discrimination and the ways in which such
discrimination has become more subtle see VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF
WOMEN (1998); Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment
Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 603-17 (2000); Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without
Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 318-23 (2002); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469-89 (2001). An
excellent symposium recently published in this Journal provides a comprehensive review of the
literature on stereotyping. See in particular the articles by Joan Williams, Martin Malin and Marc
Poirier in Symposium, Litigating the Glass Ceiling & the Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping &
Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (2003).
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in the workplace and I firmly believe that much of the discrimination
women encounter can be described as subtle, depending on how that term
is used.13 What I mean to suggest instead, is that there remains a
significant amount of discrimination in the workplace that is not properly
labeled as subtle but which involves the active and conscious exclusion of
women from the workplace, and if we are to make further progress toward
greater equality both in and outside of the workplace we must remain
focused on the entrenched nature of institutional sex discrimination.
Although the class action cases are generally inconsistent with the
theories steeped in subtle discrimination, they are consistent with a theory
of sexual harassment that has recently been advanced by Professors
Kathryn Abrams and Vicki Schultz.14 Under the theories developed by
these scholars, sexual harassment is less about sexual desire or dominance
and more about preserving male norms within the workplace. As will be
discussed in more detail shortly, their theories help explain the underlying
basis for the class action cases, and this is true even for those cases that do
not involve formal claims of sexual harassment but are instead presented as
classic cases of disparate treatment discrimination.
This article will be divided into three sections. In section II, I will
discuss the set of cases that have arisen over the last decade in three areas:
(1) securities industry; (2) grocery industry and (3) class action sexual
harassment cases. In section III, I will then offer some analysis of what
these cases can tell us about the nature and persistence of discrimination,
and the many ways in which our narratives of gender mask the reality of
discrimination. In section IV, I will add some reflections on what these
cases mean for the way in which we think about sex discrimination in the
future. I should also add that this article is primarily intended as what I call
a “reminder” piece, with the reminder here being that intentional and overt
discrimination against women remains a vital part of the labor market.
II. THE CLASS ACTION SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES
During the last decade there has been a sharp rise in class action cases
13. For some of my contributions on the subject see Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit,
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1284-89 (1995) (discussing
relationship between subtle discrimination and affirmative action); Michael Selmi, Response to
Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident, Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999)
(exploring meaning of subtle discrimination in the context of Professor Wax’s argument). More
recently I have cautioned against expansive definitions of subtle discrimination. See Michael Selmi,
Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657
(2003).
14. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169 (1998); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683 (1998).
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alleging widespread patterns of employment discrimination.15 Many of the
most prominent cases have involved allegations of race discrimination,
including those filed against Texaco and Coca-Cola,16 but there have also
been a slew of cases challenging patterns of sex discrimination within a
diverse array of industries. The first major case, arose in the 1980s and
involved a challenge to the job assignments of the State Farm Insurance
Company which had traditionally failed to hire women for positions as
insurance agents.17 That case settled for more than $150 million, and
remains the largest settlement in a sex discrimination case involving a
private party.18 Perhaps prompted by the success of the State Farm case,
similar cases were filed challenging discriminatory assignment practices in
the securities and grocery industries.19 At about the same time as these
cases were developing, a series of class action sexual harassment cases
arose that have much in common with the exclusionary practices that were
challenged in the assignment cases.20 In this section, I will describe the rise
of class action litigation in the securities and grocery industries, as well as
in the sexual harassment class action cases.
A. The Securities Industry
The securities industry has long been identified as an aggressive,
male-dominated industry, and indeed, the popular image is not far from the
mark. On the trading floor and in Wall Street offices, macho behavior,
including crude language and boorish conduct, is often the norm.21 At the
15. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1249 (discussing the rise in class action litigation).
16. See Alison Frankel, Tale of the Tapes, AM. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 64 (providing a detailed
analysis of the Texaco litigation); Henry Unger, Coke to Settle Racial Suit with $192.5 Million Deal,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 17, 2000, at A1 (discussing Coca-Cola suit). I discuss the Texaco litigation
in Selmi, supra note 4, at 1268-80.
17. Sales of insurance policies was a field traditionally reserved for men. See Robin Leidner,
Serving Hamburgers and Selling Insurance: Gender, Work, and Identity in Interactive Service Jobs, 5
GENDER & SOC’Y 154, 161-63 (1991) (discussing the gendered nature of jobs within insurance
industry).
18. See Philip Hager, State Farm to Pay Women $157 Million for Job Bias, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1992, at A1. The largest sex discrimination settlement, indeed the largest discrimination settlement of
any kind, involved a lawsuit against the United States Information Agency after nearly twenty-five
years of litigation. See Bill Miller & David A. Vise, U.S. Settles Job Bias Case: A Record $508 Million
is Due Women in USIA Dispute, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2000, at A1.
19. Many of the grocery store cases were filed by the firm that handled the State Farm case. See
Russell Mitchell, The SWAT Team of Bias Litigation, BUS. WK., Jan. 23, 1995, at 88. One of the
original partners in the law firm is also involved in the case against Wal-Mart, which is being handled
by a consortium of attorneys. See Steve Salter, The New Big (Legal) Thing?, FAST CO., April 2003, at
112 (discussing Brad Seligman and the other attorneys representing plaintiffs).
20. See text accompanying notes 101-28, infra.
21. There is an extensive literature chronicling the behavior that prevails on Wall Street. See, e.g.,
FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER (1998). For an earlier
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same time, the industry is not just a place to move money but it is also a
place where money can be made in droves, and women have long sought
their place in the industry. Over the last decade, women have gradually
infiltrated the securities profession, though they remain a substantial
minority in all but the least desirable clerical positions. As of 1996 when
many of the cases were filed, approximately 15 percent of the more than
100,000 brokers nationwide were women, and women held fewer than 10
percent of the senior management positions.22 By 2003, the figures were
nearly the same: approximately 16 percent of the brokers and 12 percent of
the branch managers were women.23 This modest infiltration of women,
however, had not transformed the workplace, which remains deeply male
and often deeply abusive.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, female brokers initiated lawsuits alleging
various forms of discrimination, including the failure to promote, train or
mentor women, the failure to assign women to lucrative accounts, and
pervasive sexual harassment, including quid pro quo harassment where
male bosses were seeking sexual favors for employment prerequisites. Few
of the major securities firms have been able to escape the allegations, and
more lawsuits are likely forthcoming.24 Although all of the cases have
settled, it is equally clear that the allegations all appear to have been
substantiated at least to some significant degree. Indeed, most of the firms
did not deny the substance of the allegations; rather, their defenses, to the
extent defenses were mounted, contended that the practices were not as
pervasive as alleged.25
Likely the best known of the cases was also the first to be filed, a case
involving the firm that was then known as Smith, Barney, an old line firm
that has since become part of the financial conglomerate Travelers, Inc.
Initially filed in 1996, the case alleged that Smith Barney had
version detailing the world of investment banking see MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (1989).
22. See Michael Siconolfi & Margaret A. Jacobs, Wall Street Fails to Stem Rising Claims of Sex
Harassment and Discrimination, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at C1. Peter Truell, Success and Sharp
Elbows: One Woman’s Path to Lofty Heights on Wall Street. N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at D1 (“Fewer
than 10 percent of the partners and managing directors at Wall Street’s leading firms are women.”)
23. See Patrick McGeehan, What Merrill’s Women Want: A Mother, a Daughter and New Salvos
in a Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, at C1, C4 (“In the entire industry in 2003, about 16 percent
of brokers and 12 percent of branch managers were women, according to a survey conducted by the
Securities Industry Association.”). The Report of the Securities Industry Association entitled 2003
Report on Diversity Strategy, Development & Demo- graphics, Key Findings, is available at
<http://www.sia.com/hrdiversity/pdf/SurveyHighlights. pdf> (last viewed Apr. 18, 2005), and the
relevant charts are at pp. 15-16 of the report.
24. The cases are listed in Table One.
25. As discussed below, most of the cases have settled without substantial litigation. As a result,
most of the case descriptions are based on journalistic accounts, motions filed in the cases, and stories
told by parties, rather than from published opinions.
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systematically discriminated against women in hiring, assignments, pay
and promotions, as well as through pervasive sexual harassment in some of
the firm’s branch offices.26 According to the allegations, only 5 percent of
Smith Barney’s brokers were women, and less than 2 percent of its branch
managers were women. The company, on the other hand, claimed that
women accounted for 13 percent of its brokers, but conceded that women
were just over 2 percent of its branch managers.27 The lead plaintiff in the
case, Pamela Martens, was a fifty-year-old woman who had worked at the
firm for ten years and who managed $187 million for the company, but
who was fired two days after she complained about discriminatory
behavior in her suburban New York office and retained an attorney to
pursue her complaints.28
More women joined the lawsuit shortly after it was filed, and the case
was eventually certified as a class action, consisting of more than 20,000
past and former employees.29 Many of the allegations have now become
commonplace in the securities cases. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged
that they were systematically excluded from lucrative broker jobs and
instead channeled into low-paying positions as sales assistants.30 Those
women who became brokers were typically denied the most important
accounts, received little to no mentoring, and were subjected to gross and
extensive harassment.31 The case became best known for what was
described as a “boom boom” room – a room located in the basement of the
Garden City, New York office where male brokers would go at the end of
the day to drink from a garbage can located below a toilet hanging from the
ceiling and from which women were excluded.32 At that same office,
women were ordered to wear short skirts, and strippers were a frequent
accompaniment for the male brokers and some of their clients;33 one of the
managers wore a gun strapped to his ankle, while the branch manager
occasionally brandished his own gun in the office.34
26. See Saundra Tory & Jay Matthews, Three Women Sue Smith Barney: Former, Current
Employees Accuse Brokerage of Discrimination, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at D3.
27. Id.; see Derrick Z. Jackson, Shutting Down the Wall Street “Frat House.” BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 21. 1997, at A31; see also Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
28. The case has been chronicled in a book by SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE BOOM-BOOM
ROOM: WOMEN VS. WALL STREET (2002).
29. Id. at 241.
30. See Kristen Downey Grimsley, 26 Women Sue Smith Barney, Allege Bias, WASH. POST., Nov.
6, 1996, at C11.
31. See, e.g., Leah Spiro, Smith Barney’s Woman Problem, BUS. WK., June 3, 1996, at 102.
32. ANTILLA, supra note 28 , at 5-16.
33. See Women Claimed Smith Barney Treated Them the Old Fashioned Way, 7 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP. 147 (1996).
34. ANTILLA, supra note 28, at 62.

8/31/2005 11:26 AM

SEXDISCRIMCK

8

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

As a legal matter, the case also became important as a challenge to the
mandatory arbitration proceedings that had been instituted by the brokerage
houses for all of their employees.35 The class action allegations were seen
as a way around the arbitration proceedings, and ultimately the case was
settled in a manner that allowed members of the plaintiff class to avoid the
mandatory arbitration proceedings in favor of a more neutral arbitration
forum.36 Under the settlement, more than 1900 women filed complaints,
the vast majority of whom were former employees.37 Most of the claims
were successfully settled for amounts that were not disclosed. However,
under the arbitration system established pursuant to the settlement, one
broker recently received an award of $3.2 million, including an award of
$1.5 million in punitive damages as a penalty for the company’s tolerance
of pervasive sexual harassment.38 In addition to the individual relief, the
settlement required Smith Barney to spend $15 million toward various
diversity initiatives, including training.39
One year after the Smith Barney case was filed, a similar class action
claim was initiated against Merrill Lynch, which at the time of the lawsuit
was the nation’s largest brokerage firm, with more than 13,000 brokers.40
35. In the last decade, there has been a tremendous amount of litigation involving clauses that
require employees to arbitrate claims against their employers, and these clauses initially gained their
popularity in the brokerage industry as an adjunct to arbitration agreements, that clients signed to
adjudicate claims against their brokers. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (permitting arbitration of age discrimination claim as part of a securities employment
agreement); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). For a
sampling of the literature see Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the
Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate
Statutory Employment Claims, 72 NYU L. REV. 1344 (1997); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or
to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 S.CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000); Dennis Nolan,
Labor and Employment Arbitration: What’s Justice Got to Do With It? 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 40 (1998);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
36. See Martens v. Smith Barney, 1998 WL 1661385 (SDNY 1998) (final order and Judgment
Approving Class Action Settlement and Dismissing Claims). In response to the legal developments,
including the Smith Barney case, a number of other firms have adjusted their arbitration policies to
make them more flexible. See Patrick McGeehan, PaineWebber to Permit Suits on Harassment, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 4, 1998, at C1.
37. Gary Weiss, A Settlement That’s Not Settled, BUS. WK., Oct. 30, 2000, at 164; see Debra
Baker, Tangled Up in Ticker Tape, ABA J., Dec. 1999, at 44. Thirteen hundred of the claimants settled
without going through the arbitration process. Weiss, supra, at 164. Another thirty-eight members
opted out of the settlement, including the lead plaintiff and a collateral proceeding began that was
designed to challenge the terms of the agreement. See Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.
2001).
38. See Randall Smith, Salomon is Told to Pay Broker $3.2 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2002,
at C1. In contrast, the first woman to go through the arbitration system lost her claim and obtained no
relief. See Robert Trigaux, Up Against the Wall, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1E.
39. See Patrick McGeehan, Judge Approves Class-Action Settlement for Sex Harassment at Smith
Barney, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1998, at A4 (discussing settlement terms).
40. See Ann Wozencraft, Bias at the Bull: Merrill Lynch’s Class Action Settlement Draws a
Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at C1.
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As noted earlier, Merrill Lynch had actually been sued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission for discrimination against women
twenty years earlier.41 The 1974 case was settled with a pledge by Merrill
Lynch to hire more women for a five-year period, but the company never
met their targets, and no one ever seemed to notice, and certainly no one
seemed to care.42 By the time the suit was filed in 1996, only 15.8 percent
of Merrill Lynch’s brokers were women, about the same percentage that
had existed in 1990, and not significantly more than had existed in the
1970s.43
Although the salacious harassment claims that had been a central part
of the Smith Barney case were absent in the action against Merrill Lynch,
the substance of the underlying claims was nearly identical. The class
action alleged that women were systematically discriminated against in pay
and promotions, largely by the subjective way in which business was
channeled to male brokers.44 As was true of Smith Barney, and the other
cases alleging discrimination in the securities industry, the women also
contended that they had been excluded from golf and strip club outings
with clients, and that the company typically viewed its female employees
as secondary earners.45 For example, one of the lead plaintiffs, an
experienced broker with an MBA, was asked during her interview how
much money her husband made.46 At a firm meeting attended by more
than 100 female brokers, it was discovered that none of the women present
had been chosen to participate in a new program aimed at generating new
investor accounts.47 The lead plaintiff in the case, Marybeth Cremin,
alleged that her supervisor made disparaging remarks about her status as a
working mother, and told her that she would be more successful if she
divorced her husband.48 When Cremin returned to work after a maternity
leave, she was ordered to surrender all of her accounts and was promptly
fired.49
41. See supra, note 5.
42. See Noelle Knox, Wall Street Battles Sexual Bias Even as Brokerage Industry Fights
Discrimination, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2000, at 1B (noting that Merrill Lynch had agreed to a goal of
having women constitute 16 percent of all new hires annually but that “[t]wenty years later, Merrill
Lynch had not yet reached the target”).
43. See Wozencraft, supra note 40.
44. Id. (“Among [the plaintiffs’] chief concerns are how accounts from departing workers, walkins, leads and referrals are distributed.”). See also Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
45. See Susan E. Reed, Taking the Bull By the Horns, AMER. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 34-35.
46. Id. at 35.
47. See Wozencraft, supra note 40, at C1.
48. Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1464.
49. Id.
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One year after the case was filed, the parties settled on terms that were
much like those adopted in the Smith Barney case, with the important
exception that Merrill Lynch did not commit any funds to diversity
efforts.50 Of the 22,000 member class, 2700 individuals were ultimately
eligible to file claims, and more than 900 ultimately did.51 The company
settled most of the claims for amounts that reportedly ranged from $20,000
to $40,000.52

50. See Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch Settles Sex-Bias Lawsuit Creating a System to Resolve
Complaints, N.Y. TIMES., May 5, 1998, at C25.
51. See Robert Manor, Sex Bias Case Could Cost Broker Millions, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 2,
1999, at 39.
52. See Merrill Lynch Offers to Settle With Women in Gender-Bias Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1,
2000, at C16.
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Table One
Securities Class Action Defendants
1993-2002
American Express
Gruntal Corp.
Lew Lieberman
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley
Olde Discount
Smith Barney
US Bancorp
Piper Jaffrey
As indicated in Table One, other cases with similar allegations
abound. Following on the heels of the Merrill Lynch settlement, two cases
were filed against American Express and Morgan Stanley. The American
Express case, which also included allegations of age discrimination, alleged
systemic discrimination against women who applied for or attained the
position of financial advisor.53 Like the other cases, the plaintiffs also
alleged discrimination in assignments, training and mentoring as a result of
sex stereotyping, namely that women were seen as not being as aggressive
as men.54 The case settled for $31 million along with a series of proposed
reforms, including new means of distributing accounts to its employees.55
Morgan Stanley became the latest securities firm to settle its case,
agreeing to provide $54 million to the plaintiff class, including $12 million
for the woman, Alison Shieffelin, who initiated the complaints. Ms.
Shieffelin had been a successful convertible bond salesperson with Morgan
Stanley with an annual salary that exceeded $1 million but who was fired
shortly after she complained about not being promoted to a managing
partner position.56 Similar cases or claims of system-wide discrimination
have also been filed against Olde Securities, US Bancorp, Lew Lieberman

53. See Kosen v. American Express Financial Advisors, Civil Action No. 01:02CV0082 (D.D.C.
2001), ¶ 1 (a copy of the complaint is on file with the author).
54. Id. at ¶ 30.
55. See Jerry Markon & Jill Carroll, Financial Firm Agrees to Settle Bias Lawsuit, Feb. 21, 2002,
WALL ST. J., at A3; David Phelps, Judge Approves Amex Settlement in Sex, Age-Discrimination
Lawsuit, STAR TRIB., June 18, 2002, at 3D.
56. See Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Highflier to Outcast: A Woman’s Story, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2002, at C1.
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and Gruntal Co., and large individual cases that have the potential to
expand to class actions have been filed against ING Barings, JP Morgan,
and Kidder Peabody, the latter of which involve claims originally filed in
1993.57
Although it is always difficult to draw conclusions from settled cases,
it is not too much to suggest that these cases, in both their volume and size,
describe an industry that remains resistant to change and hostile to women.
Equally clear, the lawsuits do not appear to have brought fundamental
change. A survey of securities firms conducted in 2003 indicated that only
16 percent of the brokers were women, and 13 percent of the branch
manager positions were held by women.58 In contrast, 87 percent of the
retail assistants were women.59 At Merrill Lynch, despite its recent lawsuit,
women’s representation among brokers has increased from 15 to 16
percent, or just one percent higher than the original goal from its 1974
lawsuit.60
B. The Grocery Industry
The grocery industry employs more than three million individuals, and
remains one of the few large industries where employees can earn decent
wages with substantial promotional possibilities without possessing a
college degree.61 Promotions to grocery store manager positions have
traditionally arisen internally, rather than from an external labor market,
and historically both the meat and produce departments have been the most
desirable positions because they are the most profitable departments and
tend to offer the greatest promotional opportunities as well.62 More
57. See Former Employee Files Lawsuit Charging J.P. Morgan Securities with Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
April 11, 2001, at C13; Kate Kelly, Floor Gover at Big Board Claims Sex Bias at ING Barings, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at C1; Patrick McGeehan, Duo Pursues Sex-Bias Cases on Wall Street, WALL ST.
J., May 14, 1997, at C1; Thomas J. Mulligan, EEOC Sues Brokerage in Gender Bias Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at C1 (noting case was seeking class action status); Leon Nathans Spiro, The
Angry Voices at Kidder, BUS. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 60; Benjamin Weiner, Three Women Accuse
Investment Concern of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1997, at B4.
58. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON DIVERSITY STRATEGY, DEVELOPMENT
AND DEMOGRAPHICS 16 (2003). The survey participants included many of the largest securities firms,
including many of those who had settled discrimination claims. See id. at 25.
59. See id. at 17.
60. See Reed, supra note 45, at 36 (“In 1996, when Cremin began her lawsuit, only 15% of the
financial consultants at the firm were female . . . Today only 16 percent are female.”)
61. The data with respect to the grocery industry can be found at http://www.bls.gov/
oco/cg/content/cgs024.stm (last visited May 3, 2005). For a discussion of the promotional process see
Stuart Silverstein, In Supermarkets’ Executive Department, A Lack of Variety Labor, L.A. TIMES, May
2, 1999, at C1 (noting that “supermarket executive and upper-management jobs don’t require the MBAs
or other prestigious degrees that are important for career advancement elsewhere . . .” ).
62. See Leslie Beyer, Fresh Trends for Profit, GROCERY HEADQUARTERS, Feb. 1998, at 35
(noting that produce “can be the most profitable department in the store”). For a discussion of the job
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recently, grocery stores have expanded their offerings to include bakeries
and delicatessens, although these departments, largely because they are
new, are not typically part of the ladder to management positions. Not
surprisingly, men dominate the meat and produce departments, while
women tend to be concentrated in the bakery and delicatessen departments.
Publix is Florida’s largest grocery store chain, and the largest privately
owned supermarket chain in the United States with sales of more than $10
billion in 1996.63 The store has long been admired for its operations, and
has consistently been included on lists of the “best places to work” in
America; and it is equally well known for its high customer service.64 Less
well known is Publix’s history of hostility toward women, particularly in
its management practices. In 1978, Publix printed and distributed
brochures opposing the Equal Rights Amendment, and as late as 1994, its
evaluation form for managers asked, “Family Status (does wife work?).” 65
In 1992, the EEOC began investigating charges of gender and race
discrimination at Publix stores, and three years later eight women filed suit
against the grocery chain, alleging that Publix discriminated against them
on the basis of their sex.66 The plaintiffs were represented by the premier
employment discrimination firm Saperstein, Goldstein, Demchak and
Baller and obtained class certification for their suit in March of 1996, with
the class consisting of more than 100,000 female management and nonmanagement employees who had worked for the company since 1991.67
The primary class allegation was that Publix had engaged in sex
stereotyping by systematically channeling women into low-wage, dead-end
jobs that would not lead to the higher paying, male-dominated management
positions.68 The women claimed that they were kept in cashier and deli
positions while men were placed in management-track stock and clerk
positions.69 To build their case, the plaintiffs’ lawyers relied primarily on
structure within the grocery industry see KATHERINE L. HUGHES, SUPERMARKET EMPLOYMENT: GOOD
JOBS AT GOOD WAGES?, (Inst. on Educ. & Econ., Working Paper No. 11, Apr. 1999) (on file with the
author).
63. See Kristen Downey Grimsley, Fla. Grocery Chain Settles Sex Bias Case, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 1997, at D1 (“The company, which is privately held and owned by its employees, had sales of more
than $10 billion in 1996.”).
64. See Erica Beshears, Survey Ranks Publix No. 1, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 22, 1997, at 1E;
Kim Norris, Publix Ranking Slides in Most Admired List, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1E.
65. See Ann Hull, A Woman’s Place, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1A.
66. Id. In November, the EEOC sought permission to join the action, and by December, the
number of named plaintiffs had increased to twelve. Id.
67. Melodee Shores v. Publix Super Markets, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381 at *31, *32 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 12, 1996). The states were Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and Alabama.
68. Nicole Harris, Revolt at the Deli Counter, BUS. WK., Apr. 1, 1996, at 32.
69. Id.
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statistical evidence – statistics that were compiled primarily by having
representatives of the plaintiffs walk into stores to observe the photographs
Publix posted of its managers. The portraits provided a compelling picture
of sex discrimination. One union representative who took part in the store
visits explained, “My God, you’d go in the stores and you didn’t need a
clipboard to write down what you saw. It was all white guys on those
pictures.”70
Ultimately, the plaintiffs compiled an impressive statistical case.
Relying on EEOC and Census Bureau statistics, the plaintiffs’ lawyers
claimed that although women held 40 percent of all supermarket
management positions nationwide, women accounted for only 21 percent
of Publix’s management positions.71 Moreover, the women who did make
it into management for Publix tended to manage the delicatessen
department, a position that was 90 percent female. Not coincidentally, the
deli department managers were among the lowest paid management
positions and traditionally had not led to higher-level managerial
positions.72 Publix also required its store managers to have experience
working as stock people, and its meat managers to have worked as meat
cutters, positions women had long been discouraged from seeking.73 In
1994, only three of the 456 (0.6 percent) meat department managers were
women, with eleven (2.4 percent) female produce managers; in contrast,
390 of the 433 (90 percent) deli managers were women.74 Plaintiffs also
maintained that full-time male employees earned on average 35 percent
more than full-time female employees.75
According to the plaintiffs, one primary reason for the segregated
workforce was that the decision-making process regarding entry-level
placement and promotions was largely subjective.76 Job openings were not
posted at Publix. Instead, managers subjectively determined who should
apply for upper-level positions and passed the information along by what
was described as a “tap on the shoulder” system.77 Managers were not
provided with any written guidelines but instead had total discretion to
steer new workers into gender-stereotyped positions. It was also alleged
70. Hull, supra note 66, at 1A.
71. Id.
72. See id. (chart detailing management positions, percent female, and maximum weekly pay.
Store managers, 2 percent of whom are women, make a maximum weekly salary of $820. Deli
managers, 90 percent of whom are women, make a maximum weekly salary of $600).
73. See Shores, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381.
74. Hull, supra note 65, at 1A.
75. Id.
76. Shores, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381 at *15, *16.
77. Id.
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that managers exercised their discretion regarding who received training in
a similarly discriminatory manner.
Publix did not dispute the underlying statistics but instead sought to
explain the disparities as a product of women’s preferences. Male
applicants, the company asserted, were more likely to have prior
experience in stock and clerk positions and the company also claimed that
women chose the jobs that they held because those jobs often had better
hours and did not require relocating.78 During the course of the litigation,
company officials made similar statements seeking to link the store
assignments to women’s interests in balancing their family and work
commitments.79
After a lengthy mediation, Publix settled the case in early 1997 for
$81.5 million dollars, one of the largest settlements of its kind.80 The
settlement also included a series of planned changes in their employment
practices, including minimum requirements for store-level jobs, and
establishing a job candidate pool so that those interested in pursuing other
positions could do so.81 The company also agreed to fill store jobs with a
number of women proportionate to those who apply and to provide
employees with new employment training and job advancement programs,
but did not agree to post job openings.82 One of the interesting side notes
to the case is that the company never seemed to suffer a loss of business
from the lawsuit even though women constituted a majority of its
shoppers.83
Although the Publix case was the most recent of the large class action
78. Harris, supra note 68, at 32.
79. See Kimberly Blanton, In the Publix Eye: $81.5 Million Settlement is a Showcase for EEOC’s
Activism in High-Profile Class Action Suits, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1997, at E1 (noting that company
official had testified that “many female associates do not have an active interest in stocking shelves”);
Gregg Fields, Publix Settles Discrimination Case, MIAMI HERALD, May 30, 2001, at D1 (noting that the
company had attributed differences in number of managers to “career choices that women themselves
made, such as reducing hours after they had children.”).
80. See Allen R. Myerson, Supermarket Chain To Pay $81 Million To Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1997, at A1.
81. Id.
82. See Lisa Blackman, Publix Pays Women $81 million, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 1997, at
1. In 2000, a group of ten women sought and were denied class certification for a new class action
against Publix representing women who work in Publix food production plants and distribution centers.
See Dyer v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4455 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2000). The
plaintiffs alleged that women were channeled into fruit and vegetable processing jobs, which were
dead-end jobs, and discouraged from warehouse jobs and higher-paying mechanic, fork-lift operator
and truck driver positions. Id. at 9-10.
83. See Michael Sasso, Discrimination Lawsuits Haven’t Deterred Shoppers, THE LEDGER, Jan.
21, 2001, at E1 (“[I]n the three months following the settlement . . . Publix’s sales were actually up
about 9 percent from the same three months in 1996. Mean while, profits were up 22 percent over the
same quarter in 1996.”).
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grocery store cases, it was typical of a series of lawsuits that were filed
against major grocery store chains during the last decade. The largest of
the cases, and the only one to have a published decision on liability,84
involved a suit against the western chain then known as Lucky’s, now
owned by American Stores. After the district court issued a strong decision
for the plaintiffs on liability, the case settled in the early 1990s for $107
million.85 A New York Times story summarized the allegations in the case
in this way: “The women said they were channeled into dead-end jobs,
either working the cash registers or in relatively new departments like
bakeries and delicatessens, rather than in the main grocery and produce
sections at the core of most supermarket operations, where jobs are
generally better paid and can lead to promotions.”86 Like Publix, the case
against Lucky’s was replete with comments from management regarding
women’s lack of "drive," their unwillingness to work long hours because of
their child responsibilities and fears that the public might react negatively
to women in management positions.87 As indicated in Table Two, similar
lawsuits were filed against Safeway, Albertson’s and Save Mart, all of
which were based on the same assignment patterns at issue in Lucky’s and
Publix and all of which settled relatively quickly.88
Although most of the grocery store cases were resolved in the 1990s,
the case against Lucky’s, and several other West Coast chains, were
initiated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the mid1980s.89 At around the same time as these cases were filed, an industry
journal featured a story on the absence of women in management,
84. See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
85. See Benjamin A. Holden, American Stores to Settle Sex-Bias Suit By Paying As Much as
$107.3 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 19993, at A2.
86. See Jane Gross, Big Grocery Chain Reaches Landmark Sex-Bias Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1993, at A1.
87. Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 332. For a comprehensive discussion of the Lucky’s case see Kara
Swisher, At the Checkout Counter, Winning Women’s Rights, WASH. POST, June 12, 1994, at H1; Eric
J. Wallach & Heidi Lichthardt, Lucky Stores Has Lessons for Employers, NAT’L LAW J., Feb. 28, 1994,
at S17.
88. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Albertson’s Settles Bias Suit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1993, at B12
(suit filed in 1992 settled for $29.5 million); Arthur M. Louis, Safeway Settles Sex Discrimination Suit,
S.F. CHRONICLE, April 2, 1994, at D1 (suit originally filed in 1991 settled for $7.5 million); Arthur M.
Louis, Sex Bias Settles Roils Industry: Changes in National Supermarket Personnel Practices Expected,
S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 1993, at D1 (noting that suit against Save Mart had settled for $6.5 million).
89. A set of lawsuits against four Washington state chains were filed in 1986. See Hal Taylor &
Cathy Cohn, Four Chains Sued for Sex Bias, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Aug. 25, 1986, at 18 (noting that
the EEOC had filed class action suits against Albertson’s, Fred Meyer, Safeway and Thrifty Stores).
One of the charges that formed the basis for the Lucky’s case was filed in 1985. See Barbara Presley
Noble, Battling Sex Bias in a Store Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at C27. Although the allegations
were slightly different, a lawsuit was filed in the 1970s alleging sex discrimination in promotions
against the Dallas area Piggly Wiggly stores. See Carter v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1150
(N.D. Tex. 1979).
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suggesting that companies were well aware of the problem, or at least
aware that men disproportionately held the top positions by the mid1980s.90 Not surprisingly, the allegations and defenses raised in those cases
were identical to those made in the more recent cases. For example, upon
the filing of the first lawsuits, one of the initial defendants stated that
promotional opportunities required transferring from store to store, and
women were not interested in relocating, the very same defense used in the
Publix case.91 Women were also said to have “chosen” checker positions
because of the “flexibility,”92 just as was alleged in Lucky’s and Publix.

90. See David Merrefield, Few Women Go Far in Industry Hierarchy, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Nov.
26, 1984, at 1 (discussing the absence of women in management). It should be noted that the article did
not attribute the dearth of women to discrimination, but instead quoted leaders in the industry as
suggesting that discrimination did not cause the disparities.
91. See Taylor & Cohn, supra note 89, at 18
92. Id.

8/31/2005 11:26 AM

SEXDISCRIMCK

18

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

Table Two
Grocery Store Class Action Defendants
1990-2002
Albertson’s
Delchamps
Dominick’s
Ingles Markets
Kash-n-Karry
Kohl’s
Lucky Stores
Publix
Randall’s Markets
Safeway
Save Mart
Winn Dixie
Despite the bevy of lawsuits, it is equally clear that the pattern of
discrimination within the grocery industry remains entrenched today, some
twenty years after the initial suits were filed. In the late 1990s, cases
alleging sex discrimination along the same lines as those discussed above
were filed against Kohl’s Markets, a Midwestern chain, as well as a North
Carolina-based chain, Ingles markets.93 Like Publix, the Ingles case was
premised on the “visual inspection” technique of reviewing photographs of
the managers posted in the stores, which demonstrated that men occupied
all of the management positions in the thirty-nine stores that were
surveyed.94 Dominick’s markets, based in Chicago, was also sued in 1995
and subsequently settled its case for more than $7 million, and in 1999, the
Florida chain Winn-Dixie settled a race and sex discrimination claim for
93. See Christine Blank, Ingles Hit By Class-Action Sex-Bias Suit, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Mar. 9,
1998, at 4 (“The suit . . . allege[s] that women were relegated to cashier, clerk, deli and baker positions,
and are seldom promoted to management.”); Tom Daykin, Suit Against Kohl’s Now Class Action,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 1999, at B3 (“The suit alleges Kohl’s segregates bakery and
produce jobs by sex, reserving the higher-paying produce jobs for male employees.”). Class action suits
were also filed against two smaller chains, Houston-based Randalls and Alabama-based Delchamps.
Both of these cases involved allegations of race and gender discrimination. See Elliot Zweibach, Taking
Action: Litigation in the Supermarket Industry, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Dec. 29, 1997, at 13 (noting that
Delchamps agreed to pay $4.8 million to settle five lawsuits while Randalls paid $2.5 million to settle a
case filed by the EEOC).
94. See Blank, supra note 93, at 4 (“A visual survey of management pictures in 39 Ingles’ stores
showed that 100% of the manager, assistant manager and produce, meat and grocery manager positions
were held by men, the plaintiffs’ lawyers said.”). Ingles quickly settled the case for $14 million. See
Stuart Silverstein, In Supermarkets’ Executive Department, A Lack of Variety, L.A. TIMES, May 2,
1999, at C1.
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$33 million that raised claims virtually identical to those in the other
grocery store cases.95
In addition to the grocery store cases, several other large retailers have
been targeted for similar discriminatory practices. In 1996, Home Depot
was hit with two class action cases that alleged that women were
systematically assigned to cashier positions rather than allowed to work on
the sales floor, from which promotions were typically made.96 Several
years later, and on the eve of trial, Home Depot settled the cases for more
than $100 million.97 More recently, Wal-Mart was the subject of what is
likely to become the largest class action case of its kind, when it was sued
by a consortium of attorneys for sex-segregated assignments and
promotions.98 The suit against Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest retailer, and
the largest private employer in the country, alleges that the company relies
on sex-stereotyping for its assignments and promotions, largely due to its
failure to post job openings and the subjective employment practices
implemented by its male-dominated management.99 A lawsuit with similar
allegations has recently been filed against Costco, a company, unlike WalMart, that is known for its well-paying entry-level jobs. 100
C. Sexual Harassment Class Actions
Many of the securities and grocery store cases included allegations of
sexual harassment; the Smith Barney case, in particular, gained much of its

95. Robert Berner, Winn-Dixie Settles A Bias Lawsuit for $33 Million, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1999,
at B2. Another Florida grocery chain, Kash n’ Karry, has recently been the subject of a pay
discrimination lawsuit by its female employees. See William R. Levesque, Female Workers Sue Plant
City, Fla., Grocery Chain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at C2.
96. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1281-87 (discussing Home Depot lawsuit and its aftermath).
97. Id. at 1285.
98. See Bob Egelko, Sex Discrimination Cited at Wal-Mart: Lawyers Seek OK for Class-Action
Suit, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 2003, at B1. At the time this article was published, the District Court
had certified a class against Wal-Mart but that ruling was on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. See Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (certifying class); Ann Zimmerman, Court Will Review
Class Certification in Wal-Mart Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at B2 (reporting that Ninth Circuit
had accepted interlocutory appeal).
99. See Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. c-01-2252 MJJ
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (on-file with author). Although Wal-Mart’s sales staff is 72 percent female, only onethird of its management positions are held by women, a level that matches its peers of twenty-five years
earlier. See Michelle Coulin & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Hostile to Women? BUS. WK., July 16,
2001, at 58.
100. See Abigail Goldman, Costco Manager Files Sex-Bias Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at C1.
The lawsuit alleges that the company does not post job openings but instead promotes individuals based
on a “tap on the shoulder” system, just as was alleged in the grocery store cases. According to the
article, “Although women make up almost half of Costco’s workforce, one in six managers is a woman,
all of Costco’s operations vice presidents are men and only two of 30 executive and senior officers are
women . . . ” Id.
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notoriety for its infamous boom boom room and other allegations of
harassment by its female employees.101 But the last decade has also seen
the rise of class action sexual harassment cases, a cause of action that had
previously not been recognized and one that remains controversial.102
The best known of these cases involved the claims filed against the
Japanese automobile manufacturer, Mitsubishi, stemming from the
practices at its plant located in the ironically named Normal, Illinois. The
initial suit, filed in 1994 on behalf of twenty-nine women, alleged a pattern
of harassment that included sexual abuse, lewd remarks and other forms of
discrimination.103 As many as 400 male employees at the 3800-worker
plant were accused of taking part in the harassment. Several years later, the
EEOC filed its first-ever class action sexual harassment suit, contending
that nearly half of the 940 women who had worked at the plant had been
subjected to a hostile working environment.104
When built in the 1980s, the Mitsubishi plant offered a rare
opportunity for high-paying jobs in what was an otherwise depressed
economy. The jobs at the plant paid an average salary of nearly $50,000,
with many skilled jobs paying as much as $100,000 when overtime was
factored in.105 These were, without question, the best paying jobs for miles
around. Most of the workers at the plant were represented by the United
Auto Workers. Importantly, the union contract made various concessions
to Mitsubishi’s Japanese management practices, including the elimination
of a standard clause that created a committee to resolve harassment
claims.106 As a result, the claims of sexual harassment at the plant were left
101. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
102. For a discussion of the rise of the class action sexual harassment claims see Melissa Hart,
Litigation Narratives: Why Jensen v. Ellereth Didn’t Change Sexual Harassment Law, But Still Has a
Story Worth Telling, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 282, 282-85 (2003) (book review). As Hart notes,
the actual number of cases that have been filed is relatively small, though they have received
considerable attention in the media and among attorneys. In addition to the cases listed in the text, a
class action claim is currently pending against Combined Insurance Co. See Mark Skertic, Sex
Harassment Persists: Women Still Face Hostility in Workplace, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 11, 2003, at C1.
103. See Paul Jaskunas, EEOC v. Mitsubishi, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, July/August 1996, at 96
(discussing the initial lawsuit). For a discussion of the case with a particular focus on the role the
unions played see Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Divided Ranks: Privilege and the United
Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1546-52, 1602-04 (1999).
104. See Ellen Warren & Nancy Millman, Abuse on the Line, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 15, 1998, at
(Magazine) C10 (“The EEOC has said about 400 of the 940 women at the plant were subjected to
sexual harassment by at least 400 of the more than 3,000 men there.”).
105. See Frank Swoboda, Hope and Hardship in Normal, Ill.: Once a Blue-Collar Savior,
Mitsubishi Struggles Under Weight of Sluggish Sales, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1996, at A9.
106. It also appears that the union failed to exercise the power it had under the contract, and like
management was largely indifferent to the harassing behavior at the plant. See Camille Colatosti,
Misrepresented Women Fight Harassment and the Union Boys’ Club, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1, 1996,
at 36. One of the women represented by the EEOC stated that when she complained to her union
representative, he responded by saying that he would help her if she first performed oral sex on him.
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to an indifferent management to address.
Both of the lawsuits alleged a pervasive pattern of harassment that ran
throughout the plant. A journalistic account described the allegations:
As early as 1992, female employees at Mitsubishi began to complain of
sexual misbehavior on the factory floor. They reported obscene, crude
sketches of genital organs and sex acts, and names of female workers
scratched into unpainted car bodies moving along the assembly line.
Women were called sluts, whores and bitches and subjected to groping,
forced sex play and male flashing. Explicit sexual graffiti such as KILL
THE SLUT MARY were scrawled on rest-area and bathroom walls. In a
particularly egregious case, a worker put his air gun between a woman’s
legs and pulled the trigger. Declared a line supervisor: “I don’t want any
bitches on my line. Women don’t belong in the plant.”107

Such behavior was so much the norm at the plant that when EEOC
representatives came to conduct an investigation, no one even bothered to
remove the explicit sexual graffiti that lined the walls.108 Unwanted sexual
advances from co-workers and supervisors were common, and strippers
and prostitutes were hired to entertain at company parties when Japanese
officials visited.109
After initially mounting an aggressive campaign to rebut the charges,
Mitsubishi ultimately settled both cases for substantial sums. The private
lawsuit was settled for $9.5 million110 and shortly thereafter, the EEOC
lawsuit was settled for $34 million along with the creation of a monitoring
group that would be in place for three years and that was empowered to
recommend necessary changes in employment practices.111 Under the
EEOC’s suit, which remains the largest award in a sexual harassment case
to date, more than 300 women recovered sums ranging from $25,000 to
$300,000 with an average award of approximately $100,000.112 Despite
these settle- ments, a lengthy report in the New York Times questioned how
See Ellen Warren & Nancy Millman, Abuse on the Line, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 15, 1998, at C10; see also
Crain & Matheny, supra, note 103, at 1548-52 (discussing the Union’s response). For a discussion of
the ways in which unions have often slighted women and their interests see Marion Crain, Feminism,
Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819 (1992); Marion Crain, Labor, Unions, & Hostile Work
Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9 (1995).
107. Leon Jaroff, Assembly-Line Sexism? Charges of Abusing Women – And Angry Denials – Rock
a Midwestern Mitsubishi Auto Plant, TIME, May 6, 1996, at 56.
108. See id. at 56 (noting that when the EEOC investigators arrived at the plant they were
“astounded to find that the company seemed unconcerned. No one had even bothered to remove the
widespread sexual graffiti.”).
109. See Warren & Millman, supra note 106, at 10 (discussing parties with strippers).
110. See Kristen Downey Grimsley, Mitsubishi Settlement Said to Total $9.5 Million: Company
Still Faces Larger Suit Filed by EEOC, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1997, at F1.
111. See Stephen Braun, Mitsubishi To Pay $34 Million in Sex Harassment Case, June 12, 1998, at
A1.
112. See Jon Bigness, Mitsubishi Settlement Checks on the Way, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 26, 1999, at
C1.
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much the plant had changed, suggesting that once the case was settled and
removed from the public’s eyes, there was little interest on the part of the
company or the plaintiffs in pursuing significant reform.113
Although Mitsubishi is the largest and best known case, Ford Motors
has struggled with similar allegations over the last few years, even though
its struggles have rarely captured national attention. The initial allegations
were focused on two plants outside of Chicago, and raised claims that were
much like those directed at Mitsubishi – a gauntlet of harassment for Ford’s
female employees on the factory floor including unwanted sexual
advances, groping, name-calling and visible pornography.114 Strippers and
prostitutes also apparently made the rounds at the Ford plants.115 Ford
eventually settled four separate lawsuits – three involving allegations of
harassment, and one for denying women entry-level jobs in seven of its
assembly plants.116 In addition to the claims against Mitsubishi and Ford
Motors, the EEOC also initiated, and later settled, class action sexual
harassment claims against Astra Pharmaceuticals and Dial Corporation.
The Astra claim settled quickly for $10 million and led to the dismissal of
its Chief Executive,117 whereas the Dial case settled for the same amount on
the eve of trial after four years of contentious litigation.118 The Chicago
113. See Reed Abelson, Can Respect be Mandated? Maybe Not Here, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000,
at C1.
114. See Joann Muller, Ford: The High Cost of Harassment, BUS. WK., Nov. 15, 1999, at 94.
115. See id. (describing a “years-long” pattern of groping, name-calling, and parties with strippers
and prostitutes). For those wondering what strippers do for a day job, these cases provide at least a
partial answer.
116. See Ford Agrees to Pay $3.8 Million to Settle Discrimination Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000,
at B16 (settlement with Department of Labor over hiring practices); Ford Increases Amount in Sex
Harassment Pact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2000, at B12 (settling class claim initiated by EEOC for $9
million in relief and $10 million for training); Joann Muller, Ford: The High Cost of Harassment, BUS.
WK., Nov. 15, 1999, at 94 (noting that the company had settled a private lawsuit for $2 million); Sexual
Harassment Suit is Settled by Ford Motor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at C14 (settling claim of three
individuals).
117. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Firm to Pay $10 Million in Settlement of Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
6, 1998 at A16. About eighty of the 120 female employees who were interviewed were eligible to file
claims. See id. The company subsequently sued its former Chief Executive, and a jury ordered the
defendant to pay more than a million dollars for breach of duties and fraud. See Bob Kievra, Jury Rules
Against Bildman: Ex-Astra President Ordered to pay $1 M, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Feb.
22, 2002, at A1. The CEO of Florsheim also resigned due to allegations of harassment. See Abraham
McLaughlin, CEOs Getting the Boot for Sexual Misconduct, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July
2, 1999, at 1. It should be noted that in neither case were the allegations of harassment the sole reason
for the termination; rather, in each instance the executives had committed other wrongs that also
factored into the companies’ decisions to terminate them.
118. See Sarah Ellison & Joann S. Lublin, Dial to Pay $10 Million to Settle a Sexual-Harassment
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2003, at B4. For a discussion of the Dial case and the allegations see
David Hechler, A White Buffalo: Dial Sex Harassment Trial Set for April 28, NAT’L LAW J., Mar. 31,
2003, at A1. On a smaller scale, the EEOC also filed and subsequently settled a class action sexual
harassment case against Cheap Tickets, an on-line travel agent. See Cheap Tickets Settles Harassment
Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at C9.
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Office of the EEOC has recently filed a class action harassment suit on
behalf of more than 100 women against International Profit Associates
(IPA), a consulting firm in Buffalo Grove, Illinois, with allegations much
like those at issue in Dial and Mitsubishi.119
Table Three
Class Action Sexual Harassment
Cases, 1991-2003
Astra
Cheap Tickets
Combined Ins.
Dial Corp.
Eleveth Mines
Ford Motors
IPA
Mitsubishi
Rent-A-Center
The cases just mentioned represent the largest and latest of the class
action sexual harassment claims, but the first to attain class action status
involved charges of pervasive harassment at a mining company in northern
Minnesota. As was true with the Mitsubishi case, the mining jobs were the
best available jobs in the rural area of northern Minnesota where the mine
was located. The case against Eveleth Mines began in 1984 when three
female miners filed charges with the EEOC, and the case was subsequently
certified as a class action in 1991.120 The case involved an all too familiar
litany of harassment – groping, grabbing, stalking, pressure for sex, use of
sexual language and pornography, men exposing themselves and
masturbating on women’s clothes. One young boy testified that he watched
his mother pack her lunch each day – a lunch that included a knife, mace
and rope to tie the door shut in her work area.121
Unlike the other cases, the Eveleth Mines case went to trial, and the
119. See Sara Burnett, Details Emerge in Sexual Harassment Case, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 10,
2004 at 1 (describing allegations).
120. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991); Sandra Sugawara, Class
Action Sexual Harassment Suit Allowed: U.S. Court’s Ruling in Minnesota Case May Widen Use of
Tactic, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1991, at D1.
121. Kristen Downey Grimsley, A Hostile Workplace: Into an Abyss of Sex Harassment at Eveleth
Mine, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at A1.
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testimony at the trial painted a picture of a workplace defiantly hostile to
women. Testimony indicated that the personnel director would frequently
comment that women belonged at home and pregnant, and that the union
consciously decided to ignore the complaints so as to protect its male
members.122 After the initial complaints were filed, a sign went up on a
manager-controlled bulletin board that read, “Sexual harassment will not be
reported, but it will be graded.”123 When the women employees asked for a
portable bathroom near the mine, their request was refused, and instead
they were told that if they were to work like a man they would have to
learn to “piss like a man.”124 Further testimony confirmed the plaintiffs’
allegations, and the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in the lengthy trial.125
But the case did not end there. The damages phase of the trial was
assigned to a retired judge who appeared dismissive of the plaintiffs
throughout the proceedings, and ultimately awarded paltry amounts to the
individual plaintiffs. His decision, however, was reversed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the damages phase for a jury
trial.126 Just before that trial was set to begin, the individual plaintiffs
settled, with the lead plaintiff receiving more than $750,000, compared to
the $25,000 the judge had awarded her.127 Although ultimately victorious
in the case, the lead plaintiff, Lois Jenson, went on permanent disability
and has not worked since 1992.128
III. THE PERSISTENCE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
What do these cases tell us about the persistence of sex discrimination
in the workplace? On the one hand, these cases may be taken as powerful
evidence of sex discrimination in the workplace. On the other hand, the
cases may be seen as a random collection that offers little meaning in the
context of the broader labor market. From this perspective, the cases might
reflect isolated incidents rather than entrenched patterns, which was, in
fact, the defense raised in many of the cases.129 To be sure, this is hardly a
122. See id. (“Union officials testified that, when presented with the complaints, they didn’t take
action because they thought it was important to protect the men’s jobs.”). See Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
123. See Grimsley, supra note 121, at A1.
124. Jon Tevlin, The Eveleth Mines Case, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1998, at 1A.
125. The case is chronicled in CLARA BINGHAM & LAURA LEEDY GANSLER, CLASS ACTION: THE
STORY OF LOIS JENSON AND THE LANDMARK CASE THAT CHANGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
(2002).
126. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
127. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 125, at 284.
128. See Tevlin, supra note 124, at 8A.
129. For example, Smith Barney sought to defend its case by claiming that the problems alleged
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scientific or statistical survey, but at the same time it would be a mistake to
dismiss these cases as aberrational in nature. Indeed, a desire to treat the
cases as isolated incidents likely reflects the very societal perception
regarding the persistence of discrimination that these cases directly
challenge. In other words, these cases appear aberrational not because they
are but because they fail to comport with our image of the changed nature
of discrimination. As a society, we have plainly concluded, long ago, that
cases of overt exclusion have all but vanished from the workplace.130 But
as I discuss further below, our perceptions of discrimination may have
changed more than its reality, and there is certainly strong reason to believe
that intentional and overt discrimination remains a substantial barrier to
workplace equality for women.
The cases discussed in this article are also important in that they
provide some of the best available evidence regarding the persistence of
discrimination. When it comes to understanding the persistence of gender
inequality, both economics and sociology, where these issues are studied
extensively, have turned to empirical analyses.131 Yet, it is extremely
difficult to establish the existence of discrimination through empirical
studies, which is, I think, one reason why discrimination tends to exist at
the margins in theories premised on empirical inquiries.132 Outside of
controlled studies that seek to match pairs of individuals on all relevant
factors other than sex, identifying discrimination through empirical studies
often proves elusive because the studies are unable to eliminate all possible
explanations. The match-paired studies, such as have recently been
conducted with restaurants and orchestras,133 offer significant evidence of
were concentrated at the Garden City office in suburban New York. See ANTILLA, supra note 28, at
142.
130. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 340-50 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s doctrine reflects a societal
desire to “wish away” discrimination); see also Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination,
55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2417 (2003) (book review) (“The simple truth is that once Bull Connor and
Lester Maddox are gone, once angry parents are not screaming, ‘Two, four, six, eight, we don’t want to
integrate’ . . . it is hard to say precisely what discrimination means.”).
131. For a collection of the works of an economist who has studied extensively the persistence of
sex discrimination in various industries see DAVID NEUMARK, SEX DIFFERENCES IN LABOR MARKETS
(2004).
132. For a discussion of the difficulty of drawing inferences of discrimination from academic
studies see John A. List, The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from
the Field, 69 Q. J. ECON. 49, 49-51 (2004).
133. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000); David Neumark, Sex Discrimination
in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q. J. ECON. 915 (1996). The Goldin and Rouse study found
that female musicians had a far greater likelihood of being hired if they auditioned behind a curtain
instead of being visible to the evaluators. Many major orchestras have moved to having musicians
audition behind a blind curtain to avoid any distinguishing characteristics other than their music, and
the Goldin and Rouse study took advantage of the data that existed both before and after these changes

8/31/2005 11:26 AM

SEXDISCRIMCK

26

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

discrimination, although even these studies are not without their critics.134
Matched-pair studies, however, are difficult to conduct and few in number.
More commonly, empirical studies of labor markets are typically designed
to measure some other variable, such as the role of work experience in
explaining gender inequity, and in these studies discrimination is treated as
a possible “unexplained variable,” one that remains as a background
possibility but solidly in the background nonetheless.
For example, many studies have sought to explain the wage gap
between men and women, and typically look to differences in experience or
education to explain the observed pay disparities.135 These studies
uniformly fail fully to explain the disparities in pay but it is rare that a
researcher will be able to identify discrimination as the cause of the
unexplained portion of the wage gap, primarily because the study was not
set up to measure discrimination but was instead designed to measure the
influence of tenure or education on labor market patterns.136 As a result,
most empirical studies are not intended to measure discrimination, leaving
case studies as some of the best available evidence of the discrimination
that permeates the workplace.
This short discussion highlights another common and important
problem with identifying employment discrimination. When it comes to
discrimination, our standards of proof are extremely high, one might say
too high. Rather than establishing discrimination as the underlying cause

in practice. The Neumark study, on the other hand, was patterned on housing audit studies, and he had
men and women with identical résumés apply for positions at restaurants in the Philadelphia area. This
study found that male résumés led to approximately three times as many interviews and five times as
many job offers at high priced restaurants. See id. at 933-36. These studies are discussed at length in
Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling? 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2002).
134. For a discussion on the limits of testing audits, frequently used to document housing
discrimination and more recently adapted in other areas, see James J. Heckman, Detecting
Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101 (1998).
135. For a sampling of the rich literature see FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF
WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 134-43 (3d ed. 1998); Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming
Upstream: Trends in the Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (1997); Linda
Datcher Loury, The Gender Earnings Gap Among College-Educated Workers, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 580 (1997). I have discussed the literature and its limitations in Michael Selmi, Family Leave and
the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 708, 714-30 (2000).
136. Christine Jolls, who is sympathetic to identifying discrimination in these studies, comments,
“[t]he difficulty with the evidence here is that it is difficult to be sure that all non-sex differences –
some of which may be subtle or difficult to observe – have been controlled for, and, unless all such
differences have been controlled for, the residual cannot properly be attributed to sex.” Jolls,
supra
note 133, at 11 (footnote omitted); see also Van W. Kolpin & Larry D. Singell, Jr., The Gender
Composition & Scholarly Performance of Economics Departments: A Test for Employment
Discrimination, 49 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 408 (1996) (finding that female economists had published
more than their male counterparts even though they tended to be hired at lower ranked schools but
avoiding the conclusion that discrimination explained the discrepancy because not all other
explanations had been eliminated).
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by a preponderance of the evidence, we typically require a level of proof
that eliminates all other potential causes. This is true not just in courts but
in the social science studies noted above, and also, I think in society more
generally. As a result, the cases discussed in this article provide about as
potent evidence of ongoing discrimination as we are likely to find.137 That
said, the real significance of these cases is not in documenting the extent of
discrimination but rather in explaining the nature of contemporary
discrimination. In particular, these cases help us understand how
discrimination is perpetuated, and the many ways in which women
continue to be disadvantaged in the workplace.
A. The Subtle Discrimination Hypothesis
As noted earlier, these cases tell a story that differs substantially from
the consensual story regarding the nature of contemporary discrimination.
The consensual story emphasizes how discrimination has become more
subtle in nature, less overt, and less common. With respect to unconscious
or subtle discrimination, the actor is generally thought to have no desire (or
conscious desire) to discriminate and is likewise generally thought to be
unaware of the way in which his acts adversely affect women.138
Within the new framework, not only has the nature of discrimination
changed, but the inequalities women face in the workplace are frequently
attributed to women’s childcare commitments, and the way in which those
137. Subjective interviews – asking those who are potential victims about their experiences – offer
another possible means of identifying discrimination, and interviews with potential victims are
frequently conducted. See, e.g., Janet Rosenberg et al, Now That We Are Here: Discrimination,
Disparagement, and Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women Lawyers, 7 GENDER & SOC’Y
415 (1993) (reporting results of survey of female lawyers’ perception of discrimination); Patricia
Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A
Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS 665 (2002) (study of perceptions of discrimination among
Florida Bar members). However, these studies often fail to provide convincing information because the
subject groups are small and frequently left on their own to define discrimination, or are provided a
definition of discrimination, which may not comport with what a court would identify as discrimination.
Subjective interviews can serve important purposes, but like all of the various methods, they have their
limits.
138. The two most influential and insightful articles on what is sometimes referred to as
unconscious discrimination are Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995)
and Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). For additional recent discussions see TIMOTHY D. WILSON,
STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002); Gary Blasi, Advocacy
Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241 (2002);
Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001); Marc Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 1073 (1999); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) (suggesting
that employers should not be held responsible for unconscious discrimination because they cannot be
expected to control unconscious impulses).
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commitments run up against the demands of the workplace.139 In this story,
there is a blurring of lines as to what constitutes discrimination, as neutral
institutional structures such as demanding work hours or inefficient
employment practices that rely on outdated modes of operation are seen as
the source of persistent inequalities.140 As is true with the focus on
unconscious discrimination, the literature emphasizing the role of
institutional factors tends to shift the blame away from employers and
towards structural aspects of the workplace that have not kept up with the
changing demographics.
There is also a third dimension to the current understanding of the way
in which gender operates in the workplace. Increasingly, legal scholars and
the popular press emphasize how women’s role as caretakers limit their
workplace opportunities, causing women to either depart from the
workplace to focus on childrearing or to seek positions that would better
enable them to balance their competing demands in and outside of work.141
The recent turn within law to focus on women’s role as caretakers, and the
ways in which society ought to give primacy to that role, likewise suggests
that many of the observed labor market inequities arise from women’s dual
roles as mothers and labor market participants rather than from conscious
discrimination.142 This is certainly not a new issue, and indeed the tension

139. See, e.g., VALIAN, supra note 12; WILLIAMS, supra note 10. Jane Waldfogel has published a
series of studies documenting the disparity in pay between women with children and those without, and
suggested that improving public policies designed to facilitate childrearing may go a long ways toward
reducing the pay disparities. See Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the United
States and Britain: Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference? 16 J. LAB. ECON. 505 (1998); Jane
Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” for Women With Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137
(1998); Jane Waldfogel, Family-Friendly Policies for Families with Young Children, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 273 (2001).
140. Professor Susan Sturm, for example, has written about the way certain company policies or
practices can disadvantage women without any particular intent to do so. See Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). For
a related approach see Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (2003).
141. See sources cited supra, notes 11, 140.
142. See WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 65-77. The recent focus on caretaking develops an argument
that has an antecedent in neoclassical economics, which has long sought to explain observed labor
market inequalities based on women’s roles in the home. For classic statements of this position see
GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 41-42 (1991) (“Wage rates are lower for women a least
partly because they invest less than men in market human capital, while the productivity in household
time is presumably greater for women partly because they invest more than men in household capital.”);
Solomon William Polachek, Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex
Differences in Occupational Structure, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 60, 65-68 (1981) (arguing that women
self-select into occupations that match their preferences). Although there are similarities between the
neoclassical argument and the focus on caretaking, the differences are more profound. In particular, the
caretaking literature seeks to identify ways to remedy the penalties women suffer, while the neoclassical
position does not see the disparities as penalties in need of remedying but instead sees the disparities as
reflecting different interests and specializations.
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between women’s roles as workers and mothers has long been embodied in
our nation’s social policy, which has typically sought to protect and define
women as mothers rather than workers.143
All of the above factors converge to create a picture that downplays, at
least rhetorically, the importance of discrimination in the workplace, and
when discrimination becomes a background factor rather than an issue in
the forefront, our societal will to address workplace issues recedes as well.
If women are “choosing” to opt out of the labor market to care for children,
or if women caring for children are unable to meet the demands required by
the workplace, then the question of equality in the workplace becomes a
matter of social policy or vision rather than the responsibility of employers.
While it might be desirable, even profitable, for employers to alter their
employment practices to accommodate women’s childrearing, there is no
legal mandate requiring them to do so, and employers are left to determine
whether such practices will, in fact, be profitable. This emphasis allows
employers off the hook much too easily.144
The cases discussed in this paper offer a decidedly different portrait
from what has emerged as the current view towards gender in the
workplace. Indeed, there was nothing subtle about the discrimination in any
of the class action cases, nor was the discrimination tied to women’s
childcare responsibilities. Instead the cases represent the kind of behavior
that many had swept into the margins in today’s labor market: overt acts of
hostility and exclusion based on stereotypes regarding women’s proper
roles or abilities in the workplace. In both the securities and grocery
industry cases, the employers based their policies on a presumption that
women were less committed to the workplace and were therefore less
interested in pursuing career paths that would lead to power and influence
because those paths would require intense devotion and long hours.
143. For an excellent historical overview of the gendered vision that has influenced social policy
see ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001). Kessler-Harris writes: “[T]he use of the
family to justify and rationalize women’s disadvantaged workforce position functions as a set of
ideological and material blinders that limits women’s access to the full range of economic life and
shapes the nature of male as well as female experience.” Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
144. Professor Alstott’s recent work is representative. In discussing the relation between influence
of childrearing on mothers’ employment, she writes: “Study after study confirms that mothers in every
income class compromise their working lives in order to provide their children with continuity of care.
Mothers work less, earn less, and achieve less than men and than childless women. Job interruptions
take their toll on mothers’ earning power. Even when mothers stay in the race and accumulate the same
credentials as their childless counterparts, they still earn less.” ALSTOTT, supra note 10, at 7. In her
description, there is no role – or no apparent role – for discrimination, and she makes the same
assessment when she discusses the motherhood gap, which she specifically distinguishes from
discrimination without discussing whether employers might, for various reasons such as their
stereotypical views, discriminate more and differently against women with children. See id. at 24.
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Importantly, these assumptions were not grounded in fact; no studies had
been conducted by any of the companies to document women’s interests
nor did the companies provide any hard evidence to support their
assumptions. Rather, the company’s assumptions were based on
management’s perceptions regarding women’s interests.145 This was
particularly true in the securities cases where many of the plaintiffs were
women who had worked long and uninterrupted careers and were earning
high incomes even while they were restricted in their opportunities.146 The
experience of these women should have provided an important
counterweight to the underlying stereotypes, but their failure to do so sheds
light on the other factors that have contributed to the hostility so many of
the women faced, including a desire by men to preserve their workplace
advantages, an issue that will be discussed in more detail shortly.147
The grocery store cases, as well as the cases against Home Depot and
Wal-Mart, are more difficult to label, as these cases did not include
allegations of harassment but instead are cases involving common
stereotypes regarding women as mothers and men as breadwinners. All of
the retail cases included allegations that the companies would ask women
about their husbands’ jobs or salaries, and most included claims that
management justified paying men higher wages because of their family
commitments.148 Stereotyping also appeared to be at work in the particular
assignments – for example, keeping women off the sales floor at Home
Depot and out of the meat department in the grocery stores, presumably
because these jobs were associated with male tasks. Butchers (who are rare
in grocery stores today) have traditionally been men, and men have
likewise dominated the construction trades, which has some resonance for
the home improvement stores.
Despite the lack of apparent hostility towards women, these cases are
best classified as claims of overt rather than subtle discrimination.
145. Occasionally, as in the Publix litigation, the company would survey some of its female
employees as a means of providing evidence during the litigation. See Shores v. Publix Super Markets,
Inc., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-28(E), 1996 Westlaw 407850, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996) (detailing
study). But outside of the litigation, none of the companies had investigated the reason for their
segregated workforces. See, e.g., Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(observing that Lucky’s had never conducted a survey to gauge women’s actual interests).
146. See supra, text accompanying notes 28, 57. One of the plaintiffs in the Smith Barney case was
earning $820,000 per year. See Susan Antilla, “Boom-Boom” Investigation: Arbitrators to Visit
Trading Floor in Smith Barney Discrimination Case, NEWSDAY, July 18, 2003, at A51.
147. See infra, text accompanying notes 162-76.
148. See supra, text accompanying notes 70-72; see also More than 900 Women File Claims of
Bias in Merrill Lynch Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at C2 (noting that “women were told they
earned less than men because their husbands could support them.”); Reed, supra note 45, at 35 (Merrill
Lynch broker Anne Marie Kearney claimed that in her interview she was asked how much money her
husband made).
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Certainly the claims regarding women’s husbands or their commitments
were not subtle in nature, and there was nothing about the structure of the
workplace that necessarily disadvantaged women. Retail hours can be
flexible, and the various shifts that are designed around the lengthy hours
the stores are open can likewise enable women to work when their children
are at school or their husbands are at home. Indeed, the often obsessive
focus on the need for flexible work conditions ignores the flexibility that
higher wages and greater management responsibility can bring.149 Instead
of actual structural concerns or barriers, it was again the employers’
perceptions of women’s interests that caused the disparities – their
perception that women would not be willing to move to different stores or
to work at night, neither of which was substantiated in any of the cases.150
In this respect, these cases resemble the famed case against Sears
Roebuck many years earlier. In that case, a class of women represented by
the EEOC challenged the companys assignment practices, which typically
relegated women to salaried positions rather than the more lucrative
commission-based jobs.151 As is well known, Sears successfully defended
its practices by claiming that the assignments were the product of women’s
interests rather than discrimination, and that same defense recurs today in
virtually all of the major class action litigation involving claims of sex
discrimination.152
Although the cases discussed earlier are largely inconsistent with the
subtle discrimination story, they are consistent with a story regarding
segregation in the labor market. Much has been written regarding the
segregated nature of the workforce, in particular about how segregation
affects the gender wage gap, and while there is little consensus regarding
how much of the gap can be attributed to sex segregation, few doubt the
extreme levels of segregation that continue to exist in the labor market.153
149. As Barbara Reskin notes, “The higher pay and better benefits of male jobs are particularly
attractive to women supporting families . . . .” Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19
ANN. REV. SOC. 241, 264 (1993).
150. In the case against Lucky’s stores, the court listed the range of excuses the company raised,
“women do not want to work late shifts, men don’t want to compete with women or have a woman as
their boss . . . that women do not have the drive to get ahead.” Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 332. The court
defined these excuses as discriminatory and based on stereotypes rather than any actual evidence. Id.
151. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988).
152. See id.
153. An “index of segregation” has been developed to measure the level of occupational
segregation that exists. The index measures the percentage of women who would have to change
occupations in order to achieve an integrated workforce, and depending on the particular measure that is
used, it is estimated that more than half of women would have to change jobs to achieve equal
representation among occupations. See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT:
MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 94 (1996); see also
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Moreover, the progress that has been made since 1970 when women began
to enter the workforce in less traditional occupations and today has been
modest, and by almost any measure, far less than was expected thirty years
ago when the civil rights laws began to be enforced.154 For example,
women accounted for 97.6 percent of all secretaries in 1970 and by 2000
the figure was 98.0 percent. In 2000, women still comprised 92.8 percent
of registered nurses, 98.5 percent of Pre-K and kindergarten teachers, but
only 3.8 percent of firefighters and 3.7 percent of airline pilots.155 A recent
report indicated that only one in five teachers are men, a figure that marked
a new forty-year low.156 It would be easy to continue this list of segregated
occupations but the point has been widely recognized; what has been less
recognized is the way in which contemporary discrimination preserves the
occupational structure and just how difficult it can be for women who are
entering traditionally male professions – whether those professions are at
the top of the pay scale (securities), fall somewhere in the middle (miners)
or tend towards the bottom (retail). In each instance, women continue to
face substantial barriers to success, and are left with a different set of
choices than their male counterparts.
Inevitably, the issue of gender segregation raises the question of
whether the observed patterns might be the result of women’s choices of
how they want to structure their work lives.157 While this is a difficult and
contentious issue, the cases discussed earlier provide two strong refutations
to the notion that the observed labor market patterns are the product of
unfettered choice. First, in many of the cases women had sought
nontraditional occupations; indeed, this is true for virtually all of the cases,
to the extent nontraditional is defined as a position traditionally held by
Francine D. Blau, Trends in Well-Being of American Women, 1970-1995, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 112, 132
(1998) (finding that 53 percent of women would have had to switch jobs in 1990).
154. See Reskin, supra note 149, at 245-48. For two recent discussions of the persistence of sex
segregation see Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers, How Does Gender Play a Role in the
Earnings Gap? An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2003, at 9; Phillip N. Cohen & Matt L.
Huffman, Occupational Segregation and the Devaluation of Women’s Work Across U.S. Labor
Markets, 81 SOC. FORCES 881 (2003). For a review of the literature, particularly as it relates to law, see
Tracy E. Higgins, Job Segregation, Gender Blindness, and Employee Agency, 55 ME. L. REV. 241
(2003).
155. These figures are drawn from ALICE ABEL KEMP, WOMEN’S WORK: DEGRADED AND
DEVALUED (1994) and Debra Barbezat, Occupational Segregation Around the World, in WOMEN,
FAMILY, AND WORK 177 (Karine S. Moe ed., 2003). For additional, and consistent, figures see
Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 293 tbl. 3 (2000) (providing a list of
sixty-nine occupations that were more than 95 percent male).
156. See Men in Teaching Fall to a 40-Year Low, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A26
(“Two out of 10 teachers are men, the lowest figure in 40 years, a survey by the National Education
Association has found.”).
157. This issue seems to have regained currency with recent popular press reports. See Belkin,
supra note 11.
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men. Yet, in these cases, there was strong resistance to women’s presence,
and in many cases women were literally chased out of their chosen
occupation. This leads to the second important critique of the choice
argument, which is that women’s choices are so often conditioned by what
is perceived as available. Again, this is hardly a new issue158 but it is one
that bears repeating, particularly in light of the diminished importance the
role of discrimination is assigned for today’s labor market disparities.
These cases also highlight how we create legitimating narratives of
gender that conceal the many ways in which gender operates. As Robin
Ely and Debra Meyerson have explained, we use gender narratives to help
us “make sense of what goes on around” us, and through “the process of
retelling, these narratives and the particular assumptions, preferences, and
interests upon which they are based, become taken for granted . . .”159 Our
narratives thus help us “naturalize” the way things are, so that we attribute
identifiable patterns of segregation to women’s interests because that is
consistent with our normative vision, or because we assume that childcare
responsibilities will limit women’s devotion to the workplace and we are
not surprised when we find few women in management positions. As the
dissenting judge in the Sears case noted, we tend to take an “extremely
uncritical” view of the arguments that justify the observed inequality, and
we likely do so as a way of maintaining our own narratives of gender.160
B. Preserving Male Norms
The cases discussed previously are also consistent with a theory of
sexual harassment recently advanced by a number of feminist legal
scholars. In an important article, Professor Kathryn Abrams has suggested
that we should view sexual harassment as an attempt by men to preserve
male workplace norms.161 Abrams defines sexual harassment “as a
158. The literature on the social construction of choices is vast. For a recent and helpful summary
see KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST VALUES 76-87 (2003).
In her discussion, Professor Yuracko makes the important observation that emphasizing the way in
which women’s choices are socialized suggests that certain choices, such as choosing to stay out of the
labor market to care for children, are inauthentic. Id. at 84-85. This observation highlights the often
intractable nature of the question of women’s choices, and reinforces the point made in the text, that the
cases discussed in this paper involve women who did make choices that were resisted by employers and
male employees.
159. Robin J. Ely & Debra E. Meyerson, Theories of Gender: A New Approach to Organizational
Analysis and Change, 22 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 103, 129 (2000).
160. See EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d at 361 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The adoption by the district court and by the majority of Sears’ analysis . . . strikes me as extremely
uncritical.”).
161. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
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phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and entrench masculine
norms in the workplace.”162 In this way, she argues, “[s]exual harassment
feminizes women by throwing them off balance in the work environment
and depriving them of opportunities the workplace could provide to chart
new, more independent courses and to explore different conceptions of
self.”163 Under this perspective, sexual harassment is less about sexual
desire, and more about preserving male norms that exclude women from
participation. Professor Vicki Schultz has advanced a similar theory,
arguing that the judicial focus on sexual acts as the paramount form of
sexual harassment obscures the many other ways in which male dominance
is preserved.164
The theories developed by Abrams and Schultz are typically
contrasted with what is known as the social dominance theory, around
which much of the doctrine relating to sexual harassment has arisen. Under
this theory which is most closely associated with the work of Catherine
MacKinnon, sexual harassment in the workplace is about sexual desire and
power, and it is typically defined with reference to sexual activity.165
Workplace surveys that seek to measure the extent of sexual harassment
almost always define harassment in precisely this way.166
1169 (1998). The idea that men act to preserve their privileges in the workplace has a lengthy pedigree
in the literature, and was particularly prominent at one time among scholars working in a Marxist
tradition. See Barbara F. Reskin, Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differentiation and the Devaluation of
Women’s Work, 2 GENDER & SOC’Y 58, 60 (1988) (discussing the literature).
162. Abrams, supra note 161, at 1172.
163. Id. at 1219.
164. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). More
recently, Professor Schultz has adopted somewhat of a different approach, contending that sexual
harassment doctrine has driven sexuality out of the workplace in a way that is not necessarily
advantageous for women. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003). In
the more recent article, Professor Schultz emphasizes the importance of having an integrated workplace
as a way of breaking down workplace barriers for women. See id. at 2151-52 (“Taken together, the
studies suggest that more integrated, egalitarian employment settings give both women and men more
power to resist stereotypes and, in so doing, to remake the culture of sexuality on their own terms.”)
While I agree with the emphasis on the need for integrated workplaces, I am less certain that the
enforcement of sexual harassment laws have somehow put women at a disadvantage, particularly when
compared to the realities of the workplace. Professor Schultz’s notion that we ought to have lots of
different workplaces, and women ought to have lots of different choices for how much sexuality they
have in the workplace, might be desirable in an ideal labor market, but given that our current situation is
so far removed from the ideal, one must choose among second or even third-best alternatives, and in
that realm vigorous enforcement of the laws may be the best we can offer.
165. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 42 (1987) (describing her approach
as the “dominance approach”); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979) (discussing sexual harassment as a possible cause of action under Title VII).
166. In her recent exhaustive survey of existing sexual harassment policies, Vicki Schultz
concluded, “It is clear that both those who conduct the surveys and those who respond to them define
harassment in terms of sexual acts, language and materials.” Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra
note 164, at 2095 n.97. For one well-known example of such a survey see U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROT.
BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING
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Although these theories are not necessarily incompatible and both
accurately describe behavior that occurs within the workplace, the theories
that focus on preserving male norms better explain much of the behavior
delineated in the class action cases. It is perhaps easiest to illustrate the
relevance of sexual harassment theory by looking to the securities cases.
These cases included very little overt sexual advances or behavior – men
were not generally interested in their female counterparts as sexual targets
but were instead intent on creating an environment that conveyed express
hostility to women, making it clear that women were neither wanted in the
workplace nor would they necessarily be tolerated. The “boom boom”
room was one explicit manifestation of this exclusion.167 This was a place
that was literally off-limits to women and where men could go for malebonding rituals that helped maintain the impression that the workplace had
not changed from the days when the professional staff was exclusively
male. The egregious harassment that occurred in both Mitsubishi and Dial
can also be seen as attempts at disciplining women who sought to infiltrate
previously all-male workplaces.
A similar phenomenon was at issue in the grocery store cases where
the job assignments made clear that women were seen as marginal
employees, and that their primary fidelity should be to their families.
While women were allowed to perform many of the necessary menial
tasks, such as working the cash registers, they were not accepted in the
higher echelons of management because these were rungs preserved for
men.168 The grocery store cases rarely contained the sensational allegations
of harassment or outrageous behavior that was central to the securities
cases, but the means of exclusion were designed to preserve male
workplace norms. Equally important, these practices were also designed to
preserve gender norms outside of the workplace by emphasizing women’s
commitments to their family over their commitments to work.
This latter point is important given that we often focus on the ways in
which harassing behavior is tied to preserving norms within the workplace,
while losing sight of the effect harassment has outside of the workplace. By
treating women as marginal employees, and by assuming that they will not
want to relocate or work the long hours necessary to move forward,
CHALLENGES 5 (1994).
167. See supra, text accompanying notes 32-34.
168. See, e.g., CYNTHIA COCKBURN, IN THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN’S RESISTANCE TO SEX
EQUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS (1991) (arguing that men resist gender integration so as to preserve their
privileged positions within firms); Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the
Law, With Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1084-85 (1999)
(arguing that men may want to expel women from the workplace to preserve their status, which can be
challenged when women enter).
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workplace norms help maintain stereotypes and gender roles in the home as
well. In this way, the gender norms preserve men’s status both in and
outside the workplace.169
We see the same interactions at work in the sexual harassment cases,
none of which involved sexual overtures or advances as a central part of the
claims. Although there was overtly sexual behavior in some of the cases,
most of that sexual behavior was too crude to be taken as anything other
than an attempt to harass rather than to seduce. The behavior at issue in
Mitsubishi, Eleveth Mines, Ford Motors and the other class action
harassment cases, involved disciplining women’s entry into maledominated jobs as a way of preserving the norms that had previously
existed. This was not behavior designed to have women act more like men,
but it was instead behavior that was intended to preserve a male space that
excluded women regardless of how “male” their behavior may have been,
or how willing women might have been to fit in.170 Many of the women in
the securities cases were aggressive, hard-working and high-earning, and
yet they were still subjected to harassing and exclusionary behavior. As the
Court of Appeals explained in its decision in the Eveleth Mines case, much
of the workplace harassment was designed “to destroy the human psyche as
well as the human spirit” of the plaintiffs.171
The desire to preserve male norms reflects two often unacknowledged
social conditions. For men, preserving workplace norms can be a form of
rational behavior. Studies continually demonstrate that female-dominated
jobs suffer a wage penalty, and, in contrast, positions dominated by men
receive a substantial wage premium.172 Integrating traditionally male jobs
169. Christine Williams has written: “Men have historically used the occupational realm not only to
serve economic advantages over women, but also to establish and affirm their essential difference from
– and personal sense of superiority over – women.” CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES
AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 133 (1989). The perpetuation of
gendered parenting reaffirms these roles. Over the last several decades, women have found that, despite
the pervasive rhetoric supporting equal parenting, they still perform the majority of work in the home,
whether caring for children or for the home itself. See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework,
Fixed Effects and Wages of Married Women, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 285, 289-90 (1997) (finding that
in sample studied women averaged approximately three times as much housework a week as men). For
a thorough discussion of studies on housework see Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1996).
170. Katherine Franke has argued that sexual harassment is often designed to create normalized
sexual behavior so that men or women who step out of traditional sex roles are most frequently the
subject of harassment. See Katherine Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? 49 STAN. L.
REV. 691 (1997). The class action cases offer little support for this theory, as the behavior was never
aimed at disciplining men or women who were seen as atypical, other than perhaps women who were
entering nontraditional professions. This, of course, does not mean that Franke’s theory would not
describe sexual harassment targeted at individuals, but it does suggest that it may not account for
systemic patterns of harassment.
171. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 (8th Cir. 1997).
172. A large number of studies have established a strong relationship between occupational
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may result in economic losses for men.173 Beyond the economic
advantages, sociologists Susan Fiske and Peter Glick have observed that
men may feel threatened by the introduction of women into maledominated jobs because “jobs that are dominated by men are seen as
requiring traits that distinguish men as superior to women.”174 Breaking
down gender barriers in the workplace may threaten men’s own sense of
their selves, while likewise threatening their substantial occupational status
even independent of the earnings premium they receive.175
This perceived threat directly relates to another lurking explanation for
why men may seek to preserve workplace norms through practices of
hostility and exclusion. Despite the allegiance to a world of sexual equality
our society frequently professes, there remains a deep social ambivalence
regarding exactly what such a world would look like. As Professor Scott
Coltrane recently observed, “Despite uneven progress in women’s
professional advancement, the basic assumption that family caregiving is
the exclusive responsibility of women remains.”176 Polls consistently
segregation and the wage gap. See, e.g., Paula England et al., The Effect of Sex Composition of Jobs on
Starting Wages in an Organization: Findings from the NLSY, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 511, 520 (1996)
(“These findings add to the cumulating evidence that those who work in female-dominated jobs pay a
wage penalty – that employers assign them lower wages than if the job had a larger proportion of men
working in it.”); Judith Fields & Edward N. Wolff, Interindustry Wage Differentials and the Gender
Wage Gap, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 105, 116-18 (1995) (finding that women were concentrated in
lower paying industries which explained between “31% to 38% of the overall gender wage gap”.)
There remains a significant gap in the college majors students choose, which may help explain some of
the observed occupational segregation. See Sarah E. Turner & William G. Bowen, Choice of Majors:
The Changing (Unchanging) Gender Gap, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 289, 308 (1999) (noting that
gender gap in majors had not decreased despite women’s changing employment patterns).
173. There is, of course, a way in which this economic advantage is illusory for those men who are
married, or even for men who have daughters. Whatever male advantage was lost by equalizing pay
would presumably be transferred to women, and it is even possible that the gain for women would be
higher than the loss for men. See Reskin, supra note 161, at 74. But looking at men as a group, rather
than as part of a family unit, there is plainly an economic advantage to be preserved.
174. Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick, Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual Harassment: A
Theory With Implications for Organizational Change, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 97, 105 (1995) (internal
references omitted); see also Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of
Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 527, 545 (1996) (“In doing gender, men
and women engage in practices that promote male dominance and female subordination in most social
contexts.”).
175. The economist Claudia Goldin has defined this phenomenon as a pollution theory of
discrimination where women are seen as “polluting” the occupation. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, A
POLLUTION THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION: MALE AND FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN OCCUPATIONS AND
EARNINGS (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper 8985 June 2002) (on file with author); see also
Marianne LaFrance, The Schemas and Schemes in Sex Discrimination, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1063, 1069
(1999) (“[W]henever there is disadvantage, there is also advantage. Women are under-benefited
because males are privileged.”).
176. Scott Coltrane, Elite Careers and Family Commitment: It’s (Still) about Gender, 596 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 214, 215 (2004). Professor Coltrane adds, “In 1960, there were more than
twice as many breadwinner-father/homemaker-mother families as dual earner families, but in 2000,
there were more than twice as many daul-earner families as breadwinner-father/homemaker-mother
families.” Id. at 217.
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demonstrate a curious nostalgia for returning to the sex roles characteristic
of the 1950s where many women stayed home after marriage and certainly
after having children. A 1996 poll by the Washington Post found that
nearly forty percent of the respondents desired to return to traditional home
life where the wife worked only inside the home.177 Other polls have
largely replicated these findings. A 2000 survey conducted by the firm
International Communications Research reported that 69 percent of
eighteen- to thirty-year-olds and 80 percent of forty-five- to sixty-year-olds
agreed with the statement: “It may be necessary for mothers to be working
because the family needs the money, but it would be better if she could stay
home and take care of the house and children.”178 A recent poll by the
nonprofit group Public Agenda asked respondents to choose between
creating public policies that would allow one family member to stay home
and policies intended to provide more public child care as a way to help
families balance their work and family obligations. Seventy percent of the
respondents chose policies that would enable one parent to stay home.179 In
reviewing the literature on housework, Virginia Valian likewise found that
there was a consensus between men and women that “women should do
most of the housework.”180
The societal view that it would be best for women to remain home

177. See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat, WASH. POST, Mar.
22, 1998, at A1 (“4 in 10 of those surveyed said, it would be better to return to the gender roles of the
1950s”).
178. See Pamela Paul, Meet the Parents, 24 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 1 (Jan. 1, 2002); see also
American Academy of Pediatrics, Family Pediatrics: Report of the Task Force on the Family, 111
PEDIATRICS 1541, 1553 (2003) (“In a recent public opinion survey 41% of women thought that a family
in which the father worked and the mother stayed at home was best for raising children; only 17% said
it was beneficial for children and society to have mothers work outside the home.”).
179. See Public Agenda, Necessary Compromises: How Parents and Children’s Advocates View
Child Care Today (2000), summary available at <http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/
childcare/childcare.htm> (last visited May 5, 2005).
180. VALIAN, supra note 12, at 40. Professor Valian noted that until their workload reaches 75
percent, most married women see their division of labor as fair. See id. Catherine Fisk has wonderfully
captured our societal ambivalence in a recounting of the paths of her friends from college, all of whom
went on to obtain professional degrees but half of whom have since left the labor market to stay home
full-time. See Catherine Fisk, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic
Citizenship in 20th-Century America, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 409-11 (2003) (book review). In an
interesting history of women’s movement towards equality, Robert Jackson argues that feminists have
had their greatest legislative successes when they have reinforced rather than challenged existing
stereotypes. He writes: “Government responses to modern feminist agitation suggest that feminist
efforts to affect national legislation succeeded only when they defined the issues narrowly, minimizing
potential effects on gender roles. Feminists did influence legislation, such as laws that provided women
equal access to credit, required schools receiving federal funds to give equivalent support to girls’
athletics, and required disability plans to cover pregnancy leaves. These successes seem to have
occurred because none of these laws threatened to initiate significant changes in the status of women or
the relations between the sexes.” ROBERT MAX JACKSON, DESTINED FOR EQUALITY: THE INEVITABLE
RISE OF WOMEN’S STATUS 201 (1998).
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with their children is plainly reflected in the class action cases. Every
reported case included statements from management officials that women
would be paid less than men because they did not have a family to support,
and often these statements were accompanied by blanket declarations that
women were not appropriate for management positions because of their
family responsibilities.181 The class action lawsuit filed against the
company, Rent-A-Center, provides an extreme example of such behavior.
In that case, which subsequently settled for $47 million, one regional
director was quoted as saying, “I have never had one female store manager
working for me and have never promoted a woman,” while another stated
that, “Women should be home taking care of their husbands and children,
chained to the stove, not working in my store.”182 Although these
statements may not be typical, they are indicative of a lingering bias that
can severely restrict women’s opportunities.
C. Why Do Employers Allow the Discriminatory Behavior to Persist?
As noted previously, it is not all that difficult to understand why men,
although certainly not all men, might want to preserve workplace norms in
which they both dominate and prosper, but it is more difficult to understand
why employers would tolerate such efforts. Excluding women from the
workplace, or treating them hostilely, has the potential to be economically
inefficient insofar as the firm would be basing its employment decisions on
irrelevant non-economic factors. Economic theory suggests that firms will
eschew such behavior, or alternatively that nondiscriminatory firms would
provide a disciplining force for the market by hiring the excluded workers
and thus lowering their own labor costs.183 Yet, the class action cases make
clear that inefficient exclusion and harassment frequently occur even in
sophisticated workplaces, and it remains a serious puzzle why such
181. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 66, 88.
182. See Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27,
2001); see also Kristin Downey Grimsley, 4,800 Women in Class to Sue Rent-A-Center: U.S. Judge
Cites Allegations of Company-Wide Bias, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2001, at E1. Among other practices
challenged in Rent-A-Center was a requirement that all employees be able to lift seventy-five pounds.
See Grimsley, supra. This is reminiscent of some of the obstacles that were literally placed in women’s
paths when they sought positions in fire departments in the 1970s. See Berkman v. City of New York,
536 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983). In 1974, just after women began
to apply to the fire department and just after Title VII became applicable to public employers, the City
of New York modified its physicial agility examination to require the scaling of an eight-foot wall,
which the vast majority of the female applicants were unable to do. The district court found the wall to
be a “literal” barrier to women’s employment and also found that it was not job-related. Id. at 194.
183. The standard reference for this argument is GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 153-60 (2d ed. 1971). The theory is considerably more complicated than stated
above. For additional discussions see Selmi, supra note 4, at 1317-20; Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS § 31 (2000).
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behavior persists, particularly at levels that indicate industry-wide patterns
of discrimination such as in the securities and grocery industries.
One possibility is that the discriminatory practices discussed in this
article are efficient in the sense that the firms gain more in productivity
from their male employees than is lost by the exclusion or harassment of
female employees. A firm’s productivity may be enhanced if the most
productive male employees gravitate towards those firms with a culture
that permits male dominance. Male employees may also be willing to
forego salary in return for working in a culture that reflects male
dominance. In other words, these workers would gain greater utility from a
male-dominated environment than they might from higher salaries. From
this perspective, male brokers would effectively agree to work for Smith
Barney rather than one of its competitors precisely because male norms
were preserved in one but not the other workplace. In grocery stores, men
might agree to begin their careers at the bottom of the firm ladder only if
they would not have to compete, or conceivably work, with women.
For discriminatory practices to enhance productivity in this way, men
would have to be substantially more productive than even the best female
employees. Otherwise, there would be no efficiency gain assuming women
were available at adequate levels to fill the positions. There is certainly no
reason to assume men are significantly more productive than women in
these fields. On the contrary, a number of published studies demonstrate
that women are no less productive than their male counterparts.184 There is,
however, some support for the notion that homogenous work groups are
more productive than heterogeneous groups, and it may be that
management’s tolerance for practices that are hostile to women can be
defended along these lines.185 That said, the evidence in support of the
homogeneity thesis is limited and mixed, and there is little about the
evidence that could be described as compelling.186 Nor is there any reason
184. Although the studies are few in number, those that have sought to measure productivity
differences between men and women have generally found no significant differences. See Harry J.
Holzer, The Determinants of Employee Productivity and Earnings, 29 INDUS. REL. 403, 415 (1990)
(finding that women had “comparable productivity” but “much lower wages” than men). A recent
study of male and female veterinarians found that productivity differences could not explain wage
differences. See David M. Smith, Pay and Productivity Differences Between Male and Female
Veterinarians, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 497-98 (2002) (finding that 15 percent pay differential
could not be explained by productivity factors).
185. The evidence is collected and discussed extensively in Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (book review).
186. A review of the existing literature concluded: “Diversity [in the workplace] thus appears to be
a double-edged sword, increasing the opportunity for creativity as well as the likelihood that group
members will be dissatisfied and fail to identify with the group.” Francis J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins,
Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational
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to believe the gains from homogeneity would outweigh the costs of
excluding, or limiting the opportunities of women.187 Moreover, the
argument that homogenous workforces are more productive seems entirely
inconsistent with the emphasis private employers place on having a diverse
workforce, as evident in the significant support employers expressed for
affirmative action in the recent case involving the University of
Michigan.188 Finally, even if true, the homogeneity thesis could not defend
the harassing behavior at issue in so many of the cases discussed here
because in most instances the employer was seeking, at least nominally, a
heterogenous workforce. Rather, the thesis might be consistent with the
discriminatory assignment or promotion practices that are also present in
many of the cases, particularly in the grocery industry.
There is one other possibility that might justify the exclusionary
practices based on an efficiency rationale. Some of the discriminatory
behavior might be consistent with customer desires or expectations, and in
this way, customer discrimination might help explain why the practices
persist.189 Customers might prefer men at the meat counter, or to have men
handling their financial matters or making their automobiles, but simply to
state this proposition is to reveal its limits. A majority of shoppers are
women, an increasing number of investors are likewise women, and it
seems unlikely that they would have a strong preference for dealing
exclusively with men, just as it seems quite unlikely that anyone would
particularly care (or know) who assembled automobiles, cut meat or
handled the vegetables.190 In this way, looking to customer preferences to
explain the persistence of discriminatory practices is much like relying on
women’s preferences to explain the observed disparities. In both instances,
the explanations are likely consistent with employers’ stereotypes but are
Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402, 403 (1996).
187. When an employer excludes a group of potential employees, and the supply of substitutes is
not unlimited, that employer will have to pay a higher wage to attract sufficient quality employees.
Even assuming there is a productivity advantage to homogenous work groups, an exclusionary policy
would only make economic sense to the extent the productivity increase exceeds the necessary wage
increase. As noted in the text, there is no evidence to substantiate this claim and it would be wrong to
assume as much.
188. See Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 368-70 (2003)
(discussing amicus briefs filed by businesses in support of the University’s affirmative action plan).
189. See Schwab, supra note 183, at 568 (“Perhaps a more important explanation for long-run
discrimination is that profit-maximizing employers in competitive markets will cater to the
discriminatory tastes of employees or customers.”). One recent study found a strong correlation
between the race of customers and the race of employees, particularly with respect to African
Americans, which the authors considered consistent with a theory of customer discrimination. See
Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes for
Minority Workers, 113 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1998).
190. For example, it is estimated that four in ten women shop at Wal-Mart in any given week. See
Liz Featherstone, Wal-Mart’s Female Trouble, NATION, Dec. 3, 2002, at 18.
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not supported by any empirical data. No company has produced any data to
support the notion that customer discrimination helps explain the
discriminatory policies. Of course, this might be because customer
discrimination has not been accepted as a legal justification for
discriminatory practices,191 but it seems just as likely that assumed
customer preferences, rather than actual preferences, underlie
management’s acceptance of the exclusionary practices. For example,
there seems to be little question that Home Depot assumed that its shoppers
would prefer to have men on its sales floors, but the company’s perception
did not appear to be based on anything other than its own perceptions or
beliefs about shopper preferences. Nor is there any evidence that the
company’s recent change in policies as a result of the settlements in several
class action lawsuits has had any adverse effect on its business.192
What this suggests is that, rather than identifying customer
preferences or an efficiency rationale to explain the discriminatory
workplace practices, employers appear willing to forego profits in order to
tolerate discriminatory practices despite their effects on the firm’s
profitability. Management’s inability to root out inefficient practices stems
from its own perceptions and biases, perceptions and biases that frequently
mirror those of their male employees. Certainly this seems true of all of the
cases discussed in this article – the behavior described in the securities,
grocery store and harassment cases all had lengthy pedigrees originating at
a time when the workplaces were almost exclusively male. Boorish lockerroom style behavior denigrating women was, for many, the norm, and it
was not seen as something that required change but was instead part of the
camaraderie of the workplace. In the grocery industry, the fact that
management was comprised almost exclusively of men appeared normal,
and was consistent with the gender schema that dominated the workplace.
More than anything else, the explanations offered by management and
others that women were not interested in the demands that came with
management opportunities helped fit the reality to their perceptions rather
than aligning the perceptions with reality.
In this way, the gendered nature of institutions becomes invisible
191. The best known of these cases involved Southwest Airlines’ attempt to only hire female flight
attendants to cater to the interests of its male passengers. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Co. 517 F.
Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). A more recent variant involved a famous Miami Beach restaurant’s
attempt to hire only male waiters so as to create a European ambiance. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab,
Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
192. A recent news report indicated that the home improvement stores are beginning to market
more extensively to women as surveys indicate that women are doing more home improvement
projects. See Fara Warner, Yes, Women Spend (And Saw and Sand), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, at C1
(discussing marketing efforts of Home Depot and Lowe’s).
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because it is seen as the natural order of things. Joan Acker has written
extensively about the way in which gender infiltrates organizations and its
processes, noting that “[m]anagers’ decisions often initiate gender
divisions, and organizational practices maintain them.”193 She contends
that the gendered nature of institutions is obscured because the organization
is theorized in gender-neutral terms.194 She concludes, “Understanding how
the appearance of gender neutrality is maintained in the face of
overwhelming evidence of gendered structures is an important part of
analyzing gendered institutions.”195
Theories of social psychology also help us understand why sex-based
discriminatory practices can persist even where they are demonstrably
inefficient.196 To the extent the discriminatory practices are left over from
an era of exclusively male workplaces, management may not have seen any
need to change what they had always done, and what had been perceived to
work in the past. This fidelity to past practices, which is common to
organizational structures, may have likewise enabled firms to discount the
complaints that arose from the female employees.
Indeed, in an era of perceived hyperregulation of the workplace,
where all firms now have sexual harassment policies and many enforce
them vigorously,197 one of the more puzzling aspects of the class action
cases is why the complaints were consistently ignored. For example, in the
Smith Barney case, the complaints of Pamela Martens fell upon deaf ears,
even though a representative from the corporate office made a token
appearance to observe the office after the initial complaints.198 The
complaints that were raised would have been relatively easy to investigate,
which was true of most of the securities cases, and yet in none of the cases
did the firms perform any substantial investigation before a lawsuit was
filed.199 In some instances, such as with Smith Barney, the company may
193. Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER &
SOC’Y 139, 146 (1990). For a recent discussion and critique of the literature on gendered organizations
see Dana M. Britton, The Epistemology of the Gendered Organization, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 418
(2000).
194. See Joan Acker, From Sex Roles to Gendered Institutions, 21 CONTEMP. SOC. 565 (1992).
195. Id. at 568.
196. For an insightful discussion of how social psychology can provide insights into organizational
inequality see James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology of Organizations and
Inequality, 57 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 190 (1994).
197. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 164 (discussing and documenting the
presence of harassment policies and no-tolerance enforcement).
198. See ANTILLA, supra note 28, at 116-17.
199. In a case in which the plaintiff was awarded $1.5 million in punitive damages under the
arbitration procedure instituted by the Smith Barney settlement, the arbitration panel chastised the
company for its “failure to undertake any meaningful investigations.” See Randall Smith, Salomon is
Told to Pay Broker $3.2 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2002, at C1. In the Eveleth Mines case, one of
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have been trying to protect a powerful and profitable, male manager but,
even in that case, the strategy ultimately failed as, once the lawsuit was
filed, the manager at the center of the controversy quietly left the firm.200
The grocery store cases, which began nearly thirty years ago, provide
another perplexing example of corporate indifference to gender inequality.
The lack of women in management positions – as well as the lack of
women in positions that might lead to management – was plainly visible to
anyone who bothered to look. After all, in some of the cases the plaintiffs
built their case by looking at the photographs of managers hanging in
stores.201 Home Depot and Wal-Mart certainly must have known the reality
of their assignment practices, and a walk through virtually any of their
stores would have confirmed that women were working primarily at cash
registers rather than on the sales floors and were absent from management
positions.202 The harassment uncovered by the EEOC in the Mitsubishi
case was so pervasive that it could not have gone unnoticed by
management level officials, and the same appears to be true for the other
cases involving patterns of sexual harassment.
Managements’ tolerance for the behavior may reflect an implicit
calculus of the value of the female employees compared to their male
employees. One notable example of this kind of calculus involved the
difficulty Pamela Martens encountered in finding new employment after
she was fired by Smith Barney. Ms. Martens had a substantial portfolio of
business, one that ordinarily would have attracted instant employment
offers, but firms were reluctant to hire her, presumably because they
viewed her as a trouble-maker who might alienate male employees.203
Beyond this kind of rough calculus, another reason the firms tolerated
exclusionary practices, has to do with the stereotypes that undergird the
very practices at issue and the way those stereotypes can hinder effective
action. If the managers begin with the assumption that women are not
the plaintiffs who went to complain to the superintendent noticed a picture of a vagina above his desk
with the words, “Miners do it better in the bush.” See Jon Tevlin, The Eveleth Mines Case, STAR
TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1998, at A8.
200. See Spiro, supra note 31, at 102 (noting that the manager was placed on leave and retired
shortly thereafter.)
201. In the Lucky’s case, the court found that the company was aware of the underrepresentation of
women in management positions as early as 1986. See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259,
331 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
202. Since I have begun this research, I have kept my own tallies when I visit stores such as Home
Depot, where my cursory investigations suggest that not much has changed in the assignment patterns
in the stores. The same is true in banks, where one is far more likely to find women as bank tellers
rather than bank managers, and it is still difficult to find a woman working in the produce aisles.
203. Ms. Martens was turned down for employment by Paine Webber, Merrill Lynch and Dean
Witter, and was ultimately hired by A.G. Edwards. See ANTILLA, supra note 28, at 133-35.

8/31/2005 11:26 AM

SEXDISCRIMCK

2005]

SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE NINETIES

45

“tough enough” to be brokers, or that they will not be willing to relocate to
take advantage of promotional opportunities, or if they assume that women
want to work part-time and are likely to leave the workplace for extended
periods to have and care for children, then there will be no reason to
examine the existing practices, at least without some shocking event, or
without perhaps a sense that they are falling behind competitors because of
their practices.204 This will be particularly true when there is some behavior
that is congruent with management expectations. The social psychology
literature explains that one of the reasons stereotypes are so resistant to
change is the human tendency to emphasize stereotype consistent behavior
while discounting behavior that is inconsistent with our gender schemas.205
This is no less true of senior management than it is of employees or midlevel managers.
The patterns of exclusion are even more difficult to change given that
they are reinforced by the social ambivalence regarding the role of women
in the labor market described above.206 Although this ambivalence often
lurks below the surface, the social signals are not hard to detect, and those
signals likely impose a constraint on change, creating what Alice KesslerHarris refers to as the “tenacity of the gendered imagination.”207
IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
There remains a serious undercurrent of hostility to women in the
workplace that is reflected in the class action cases that have arisen over the
last decade and which involve overt acts of hostility towards women with
an intent to preserve male workplace norms that have persisted despite our
national pledges of gender equality. These cases also help explain why we
have not made more progress towards integrating the workplace, and why
the labor market remains so deeply segregated by sex. This is not to
suggest that all of the gender inequities we observe result from intentional
acts of discrimination – no single theory of discrimination, no one theory of
the workplace, can adequately explain what we observe. Rather than
204. In his recent book on the persistence of racial discrimination, Glenn Loury describes a similar
process among individuals who fail to notice the need for change because their world view comports
with an “inchoate sense of the natural order of things.” GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY 41 (2001).
205. See generally Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 340 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); see also Linda A.
Jackson, et al., The Effects of Stereotype Consistency and Consensus Information on Predictions of
Performance, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 293 (1993); John M. Darley & Russell H. Fazio, Expectancy
Confirmation Processes Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 867 (1980).
206. See supra, text accompanying notes 177-80.
207. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 143, at 291.

8/31/2005 11:26 AM

SEXDISCRIMCK

46

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

relying on a unitary theory, we should look to many different theories and
explanations to help us piece together the puzzle that gender inequality in
the workplace remains.208 The premise of this essay is that intentional
discrimination remains a critical piece of the puzzle.
Women’s experience in the workplace has plainly not changed as
much as is often stated or hoped. Equally clear, this is not simply a result
of institutional factors, of difficulties women may have in balancing their
various commitments, or of their own preferences. Instead, the inequality
is deeply grounded in gender stereotypes and assumptions about women’s
interests – gender stereotypes and assumptions that reflect views that we
typically associate with an earlier era. One problem with the subtle
discrimination literature is its tendency to remove the blame for persistent
inequalities from the actors who are responsible for the actions that produce
those inequalities, shifting the blame instead to amorphous institutions or
the purported benign actions of well-intentioned individuals. Most of the
behavior described in this article can only be described as subtle if that
term is used to encompass any behavior that is not accompanied by overt
statements of hostility to women. This would, however, be a curious
definition of subtle discrimination, particularly in the twenty-first century
when such statements are thankfully quite rare – though as these cases
indicate, certainly not non-existent. Although subtle forces play a strong
role in perpetuating gender inequities,209 intentional discrimination likewise
plays an important role, and one that is too often ignored.
This is the point at which I would traditionally be expected to offer
policy prescriptions for eradicating the effects of discrimination from the
workplace, perhaps by calling for greater enforcement of the law, or a
change in the law, such as enhancing penalties or more diversity training.
But that is not the purpose of this paper. Instead, I have here sought to
marshal evidence from existing cases as a way of demonstrating the
persistence of intentional discrimination against women in the workplace at
a level that exceeds common perceptions. This level of discrimination is
largely invisible because it is so common, and because it raises
fundamental questions regarding our societal commitment to gender
equality – a commitment that has always been more powerful rhetorically
208. In a related sense, Kathryn Abrams writes, “[F]eminists should argue that one size cannot fit
all, theoretically speaking; it is crucial to see women’s inequality as the product of many intersecting
motives, constructions, and modes of treatment.” Abrams, supra note 161, at 1217.
209. For two helpful discussions of the ways subtle forces can lead to various inequities see
VALIAN, supra note 12 and Sturm, supra note 12. Valian in particular emphasizes the way in which
women are affected by what she defines as “cumulative disadvantage,” the cumulative effect of
stereotypes, slights and assumptions.
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than in its implementation.
There is another reason for withholding policy prescriptions: I am not
at all certain that there is an easy fix or that some of the common policy
suggestions would advance the cause of workplace integration or equality.
As I have noted elsewhere, I believe the recent focus on caretaking
represents a step backward rather than a step forward in the quest for
gender equality because it enshrines caretaking as women’s work, and
frequently privileges care work over labor market work.210 I also do not
think education or diversity training will likely move us forward,
particularly since so much of both are litigation driven and, as a result,
primarily offer businesses public relations cover more than they offer
meaningful education for employees.211 This is not to suggest that training
makes no difference – it is certainly the case that there are many
employment practices committed employers can institute to decrease
workplace barriers for women. The comprehensive study and follow-up
conducted by Johns Hopkins University when it discovered that its female
professors were consistently falling behind their male peers is one example
of a successful course for change.212 Replacing subjective employment
practices with more a formal process has also been demonstrated to reduce
gender inequities.213
As the demographics of the workplace continue to evolve, more
employers are likely to enact policies intended to retain and attract female
employees. But the models of change remain the exception rather than the
rule – a rule that seems far more represented in the class action cases
discussed earlier. If one looks at the securities or grocery industry, if one
walks into a Home Depot or a Wal-Mart, if one looks at an auto assembly
line, or tries to find a female firefighter or police officer, it will become
clear that we remain far from our commitment of gender equality in the
workplace. More than anything else, the cases discussed in this article
210. See Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Caretaking and the Contradictions of Contemporary
Policy, 55 ME. L. REV. 289 (2003); Michael Selmi, Care, Work, and the Road to Equality: A
Commentary on Fineman and Williams, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557 (2001).
211. There is little question that diversity training has become the preferred cure of the day, but
there is a substantial question whether any of that training is beneficial. For a thorough review of the
literature, and one that concludes that there is little documented support for the benefits of diversity
training see Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001).
212. See VALIAN, supra note 12, at 319-22.
213. See Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations’
Employment of Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210 (2000) (finding that decreasing
subjectivity through more formal processes can be critical to decreasing discrimination in large
organizations).
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